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Intellectual property rights such as patents protect new inventions from
imitation and competition. Patents’ major objective is to provide incentives
for invention, sacrificing short-term market efficiency for long-term
economic gains. Although patents are primarily granted to private firms,
policy changes over the last 25 years have resulted in greater use of
patenting by the public sector. This study examines government patenting
behavior by analyzing case studies of patenting and licensing by the Agri-
cultural Research Service (ARS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
ARS uses patenting and licensing as a means of technology transfer in cases
in which a technology requires additional development by a private sector
partner to yield a marketable product. Licensing revenue is not a major
motivation for ARS patenting. More widespread use of patenting and
licensing by ARS has not reduced the use of traditional instruments of tech-
nology transfer such as scientific publication. Once the decision has been
made to patent and license a technology, the structure of the licensing agree-
ment affects technology transfer outcomes. As commercial partners gain
experience with the technology and learn more about the market, mutually
advantageous revisions to license terms can maintain the incentives through
which private companies distribute the benefits of public research.
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Intellectual property rights—patents, copyrights, and trade secrets, for
example—protect new creations from imitation and competition. Patents
provide an incentive for invention by granting a proprietary right to generate
income from the invention—temporarily limiting the number of suppliers in
a market. In granting patents, short-term market efficiency is sacrificed for
long-term economic gains. Society in return gets new products and services,
as well as voluntary disclosure of the technology needed to create them,
which is made public upon grant of the patents. Major legislative and other
developments in U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR) policy over the past
25 years have resulted directly or indirectly in greater use of patents by the
public, as well as the private sector. These measures have generated consid-
erable analysis of IPR policy.
The private sector depends on clearly defined and enforceable property
rights for markets to function. Patents exist to restrict the use, sale, and
manufacture of inventions and thereby to stimulate private sector investment
in research and development. The Federal Government also holds numerous
patents on inventions and discoveries from successful public research. 
What Is the Issue? 
Why does the government need to patent at all? Patent rights are a means
not only of capturing revenue but also of providing a mechanism through
which publicly owned laboratories and other government research facilities
can widely distribute a technology they have developed. Patent rights on
Federal research are typically licensed to corporate partners, providing
incentives for further development into commercial products—from proto-
type to near-market readiness. Awarding patents to government entities also
can raise awareness of public research results; patents can also be employed
defensively to promote wider use of a research tool if it seems likely that
another entity might patent a similar technology in order to restrict access. 
If a primary public policy objective behind government patents is to widely
distribute the benefits, how well is that objective being achieved? Little
analysis has been done on patenting as a means of technology transfer from
Federal laboratories. This report examines government patenting behavior
by focusing on patenting and licensing by USDA’s Agricultural Research
Service (ARS) as a means of technology transfer.
What Did the Study Find? 
Patenting and licensing can be consistent with the objective of widespread
distribution of the benefits of ARS research. A technology that reaches
society through private sector development of ARS research provides more
net social benefits than a technology that is not developed at all because no
private firm commercializes it—provided technology transfer activities do
not withdraw too many resources from ARS’s most important missions. This
conclusion is likely applicable to other Federal research agencies as well.
iv
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technology transfer, not as a means of generating revenue to finance
research. ARS licensing revenue only partially funds the operations of its
Office of Technology Transfer (OTT), and only makes up 0.3 percent of the
ARS total budget. An important factor in the ARS patent-application process
is the likelihood of finding an acceptable partner for commercialization of
the technology. 
Increased patenting and licensing by ARS has not reduced the number of
traditional instruments of technology transfer, such as scientific publica-
tions. From 1990 through 2003, as ARS patenting and licensing—and other
newer means of technology transfer—increased, scientific publication
counts for ARS remained relatively stable.
The ARS Office of Technology Transfer is often compared with university
OTTs. Although both are nonprofit institutions, they have different objectives.
Protocols for technology transfer through licensing are more restrictive for the
Federal Government than for universities. The Federal Government follows
specific guidelines to ensure transparency and fairness in its licensing arrange-
ments. All other things equal, first preference for federally licensed technolo-
gies is given to smaller firms (typically fewer than 500 employees).
Determining the success of licensing terms and practices is very difficult—
the success of a license depends on market size, market characteristics, and
technology characteristics, and is subject to both “technology risk” and
“appropriation risk.” “Technology risk” refers to the probability that a tech-
nology can be improved and developed into a feasible commercial product
or process that is an improvement over available alternatives. “Appropriation
risk” is the likelihood that a company will be able to earn profits from the
new technology and not have them captured almost entirely by competitors.
Potential market and technology parameters (e.g., size and characteristics)
are often not known in detail when licenses are negotiated. 
ARS does retain some flexibility in renegotiating license terms. The relevant
market size and characteristics may become clearer over time. Similarly,
different characteristics of a particular technology may turn out to have
greater market potential than initially envisioned. Ex post flexibility can
correct ex ante mistakes in predicting technology success or failure.
Also, licensing to more than one firm is more likely to be successful if the
market is segmented geographically or by stages in a production process
than if all firms are competing for the same market niche. Co-exclusive
licensing when licensees are direct competitors for the same market niche
can reduce collaborative efforts with ARS inventors in product development.
Federal research agencies differ in size of research budget, markets for
possible commercial applications of their research, and management struc-
ture. Further research would be needed to determine how this report’s
specific findings might apply to practices in other agencies.
v
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The study relied on two principal areas of analysis. The first was four case
studies of technologies developed, patented, and licensed by ARS. The case
studies were selected through consultation with the ARS Office of Tech-
nology Transfer (OTT). The authors interviewed scientists responsible for
the inventions, ARS patent advisors who helped to determine patentability,
and representatives of the eventual licensees. Secondly, the study drew on
information from an earlier Economic Research Service (ERS) study that
examined licenses of ARS technologies by research area and by characteris-
tics of the technologies’ social benefits.
The authors compared data on technology transfer, including data on
patenting and licensing by ARS, with data from other institutions such as
private firms, U.S. universities, and other Federal laboratories. This was
accomplished through a review of the literature on the use of patenting and
licensing by these different types of institutions, and analysis of data from
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the Department of Commerce, and
ERS’s Agricultural Biotechnology Intellectual Property database, available
at: http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/AgBiotechIP.
vi
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The Federal Government holds numerous patents on inventions and discov-
eries from successful public research. But patents exist to restrict the use,
sale, and manufacture of inventions. If a primary objective of the public
sector is to distribute the benefits of public research as widely as possible,
why does the government patent at all?
The key principle behind patenting is that granting a proprietary right to
generate income from inventive activity is expected to spur inventions. At
the same time, disclosing the invention adds to the stock of knowledge,
thereby enabling further discovery. Inventiveness and technical change are
the engines of economic growth—so it is generally presumed to be in the
public interest to grant intellectual property rights (IPR). The private sector
depends on clearly defined and enforceable property rights for markets to
function and, therefore, enforceable IPR might stimulate private sector
investment in research and development. But this does not explain why the
public sector would need to patent its technologies.
One explanation for public sector use of patents is that patent rights are not
only a means of capturing revenue, but also a mechanism through which
public laboratories and other government research facilities can transfer
technology they have developed into widespread use. Patent rights on
Federal research are typically licensed to corporate partners, providing
incentives for subsequent development of commercial products. The Bayh-
Dole and Stevenson-Wydler Acts of 1980 were intended to increase the rate
at which new technologies are commercialized and to facilitate inventor
involvement in technology development.1
Patent awards raise awareness about public research results. Greater aware-
ness of recent results can spur further private sector development. Govern-
ment patenting allows Federal research facilities to take credit for their
work. Another rationale for government patenting is defensive in nature—
the increasingly widespread use of patents could obstruct the government
from pursuing public research objectives. Overlapping patent rights—for
example, when a large number of owners hold rights in previous discoveries
that could be used as building blocks in future research—might motivate
patenting of Federal research when such overlapping rights threaten
commercial use of the research, or when they hamper widespread use of
federally developed research tools.
The debate over the appropriate role of patenting for public sector research
dates back to the 1920s and 1930s, when increasing links between univer-
sity and industry research stimulated discussion of patent policy by univer-
sity administrators and the American Association for the Advancement of
Science. Some issues raised in those early decades anticipated the debates
over the Bayh-Dole Act 45 years later (Mowery and Sampat, 2001). Debates
about the Federal Government’s right to patent the results of federally
funded research date back to the 1880s, but assumed greater importance at
the beginning of World War II (Jaffe and Lerner, 2001; Cohen and Noll,
1996).
1
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1The Bayh-Dole Act allowed uni-
versities, nonprofit institutions, and
small businesses to patent research
discoveries partially financed with
Federal funds. The Stevenson-Wydler
Act allowed Federal laboratories to
issue exclusive licenses for patents of
their inventions. For a fuller discus-
sion, see the chapter titled
“Technology Transfer by Federal
Agencies.”The Bayh-Dole and Stevenson-Wydler Acts were part of a series of broad
IPR policy changes over the past 25 years. This legislation extended privi-
leges for patenting and licensing by inventors in universities and govern-
ment laboratories whose inventions were developed partly or wholly with
Federal funding. The other major changes were:
(1) The creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC)
in 1982 to provide a single national court for the judicial review of
patent decisions
(2) The extension of the applicability of patent rights to new technolog-
ical areas, particularly gene technology, software, or business methods2
(3) Attempts to extend and harmonize intellectual property protection
internationally through trade agreements (Jaffe, 2000).
These policy changes have stimulated a great deal of economic analysis of
IPR policy (Jaffe, Lerner, and Stern, 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; Cohen
and Merrill, 2003). To date, this research has focused particularly on
patenting by private firms and universities. With a few exceptions, little
analysis has been done regarding patenting as a means of technology
transfer from Federal laboratories (Jaffe and Lerner, 2001). The same instru-
ment—e.g., patenting and licensing—may often be used with different,
although partially overlapping, ends in mind, as firms and universities have
different objective functions. Jaffe and Lerner’s research suggests that the
objective functions of Federal laboratories are likely to differ further from
those of both private firms and universities. Our report provides a detailed
examination of issues raised by government patenting behavior, with empir-
ical examples drawn from patenting and licensing by the Agricultural
Research Service (ARS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).
Our analysis, like Jaffe and Lerner’s, suggests that ARS uses patents and
licenses in different ways than firms or universities do.
2
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2These extensions were signaled
both by judicial decision—for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court ruling in
Diamond vs. Chakrabarty extending
patentability to genetically modified
microorganisms in the case of gene
technology—and modifications in the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s
examination procedures.The Public Policy Background and the
Economic Case for Intellectual Property
To answer the question of why ARS patents and what it does with the
patents it holds, we focused particularly on case studies of technologies
patented and licensed by the agency. The case study methodology provides
detailed information from interviews with the actors in the process—the
inventors, the patent and technology transfer specialists, and the licensees.
Case studies can lead researchers to conclusions that are obvious to practi-
tioners but not evident from data (Helper, 2000). Case study information
does not allow statistical tests, however, so it needs to be complemented by
other empirical information to support the conclusions drawn. In this report,
“other empirical information” includes:
(1) A history of U.S. patent institutions and their hypothesized func-
tions
(2) Brief discussions of data on Federal Government activity in scientif-
ic research and technology transfer
(2) Equivalent data for ARS as the agency principally responsible for
agricultural research within the Federal Government
(4) The alternative technology transfer mechanisms used by ARS
The aggregate data demonstrate the change in the Federal Government’s
patenting and licensing strategy since the 1980s. For many years, the
Federal Government often took title to the patentable research it funded.
Licenses, if any, were nonexclusive, and many Federal patents were consid-
ered to have little commercial value. Following the policy changes of the
1980s, patenting and licensing increasingly became instruments of Federal
technology transfer policy. This study of ARS looks in detail at the opera-
tion of an office of technology transfer (OTT) in a particular Federal agency,
and clarifies the ways in which such an OTT accomplishes technology
transfer through patenting and licensing.
Constitutional Law and Incentives for
Science
Intellectual property law in the U.S. arises from the U.S. Constitution.
Article I, section 8, of the U.S. Constitution states:
Congress shall have power ... [t]o promote the progress of science
and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inven-
tors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.
Over time, Congress used this power to pass laws for the encouragement of
inventive and creative efforts. The Patent Act of 1790 was the first such law.
Patent law provides the economic incentive to undertake such efforts
because of the temporary exclusive rights of owners to generate income
from these inventions. Thomas Jefferson, first head of the Patent Office,
believed that inventive activity was the engine of growth. At the same time,
the idea of owning new knowledge and inventions conflicted with the idea that
new knowledge should be freely available to encourage further inventiveness
3
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encourage and disseminate inventions, not conceal or contain them. Because
of these beliefs he formulated a policy for patents that encouraged invention
but maintained restrictions on what could be patented. That policy is essen-
tially the basis for our patent law today.
An Overview of Intellectual Property
Intellectual property rights (IPR), such as patents, copyrights, and trade
secrets, protect new creations from imitation and competition. The major
policy objective of IPR is to restrict temporarily the number of suppliers in a
market in order to provide incentives for innovation by allowing innovators
to reap commercial success from their creations. In return, society gets new
products and services, as well as voluntary disclosure of the technology
needed to create them. Intellectual property rights usually last for a limited
period; when intellectual property rights expire and an invention is no
longer protected, anyone is free to compete against the original inventor. In
general, granting IPR aims to sacrifice short-term market efficiency for
long-term economic gains (King, 2001).
An important role of IPR is to create a market for innovation. Institutions or
individuals with important intellectual property assets do not necessarily
possess the complementary assets, commercial skills, or market presence
necessary to bring their products to market. IPR provide inventors a negoti-
ating tool with which to license or sell an invention to other firms better
positioned to commercialize it.
However, IPR also have drawbacks. They insulate IPR owners from compe-
tition, creating market inefficiencies. Protected markets permit higher prices
that may maximize profits but may also restrict the widespread use of new
inventions. IPR owners might also feel less incentive to innovate because
they risk cannibalizing their own markets (Reinganum, 1983). Strong IPR
also might hinder innovation if granted for a research tool or fundamental
technology necessary for future improvements. While IPR can be licensed
to other parties, owners of these kinds of IPR might refuse to grant licenses
for strategic reasons. The problem could compound in areas of rapid and
complex research in which many licenses might be necessary for further
improvements, because the owner of any one of them could hold up further
research (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Shapiro, 2001).
The net social gains from intellectual property (IP), particularly the patent
system, sometimes are assumed to be positive. That is, the benefits to
society from greater innovation are thought to outweigh the costs of market
power or research holdup. This has certainly been the reasoning behind the
major changes in IP policy in recent years. However, the empirical evidence
to support this contention is limited and nuanced. Patents are only one of a
number of factors that motivate invention, and their influence may be
stronger in some industries, such as pharmaceuticals and chemicals, than in
others. This might be caused in part by the combination of relatively high
research intensity in these industries with the fact that new drugs or chemi-
cals typically are composed of a relatively small number of patentable
components (Scherer et al., 1959; Taylor and Silberston, 1973; Mansfield
4
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IP systems do result in subtle economic differences. For example, the
Japanese system is designed in part to promote greater intra-industry knowl-
edge spillovers than the U.S. system is (Cohen et al., 2002). It has become
particularly difficult to measure the economic impacts of the U.S. patent
system in recent years because of the large policy changes in that system
that started in the 1980s and are still ongoing (Jaffe 2000).
Empirical studies of the economic impact of patent protection fall into one
or more of several subcategories:
(1) the impact of patents on innovation
(2) the impact of patents on the disclosure of inventions
(3) the impact of patents on technology transfer (Gallini, 2002)
Empirical research also has been initiated in response to criticisms of
stronger patent protection, in particular problems associated with new
subject matter, changes in the standard for nonobviousness,3 and the rise in
patent litigation costs (Gallini, 2002; see also Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998). 
The greatest empirical interest has concerned the question of the impact of
patents on innovation, but strong patent protection also may promote
vertical specialization and reduce transactions costs in negotiating contracts
during the process of technology transfer (see a review in Gallini, 2002,
especially pp. 141-144). Reduction of transactions costs has been considered
particularly important in technology transfer from universities to industry
(Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Hellmann, 2005). 
Our study is particularly concerned with the impact of patents on the devel-
opment and commercialization of inventions already produced by public
sector institutions, in particular by the Agricultural Research Service (ARS)
of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Our focus is on the economic inter-
action between the IPR and technology transfer, and on how this interaction
affects public research outcomes.4
Approaches to the Empirical Study of
Technology Transfer
One analytical approach to technology transfer is from the “market failure”
perspective. In this approach, competitive markets allow buyers and sellers
to communicate through price signals, leading to an efficient level of
production. At times, however, markets fail to produce an efficient amount
of a good for several reasons.
One of these reasons is the existence of “externalities.” Externalities occur
when production or consumption of a good affects a party external to the
transaction. A “positive externality” occurs when a transaction benefits a
party external to the transaction. For instance, a homeowner who purchases
flowerbeds and landscaping services to beautify the exterior of her house
also benefits the next-door neighbors, who might enjoy the beauty of the
flowers and an increase in neighborhood property values. The neighbors
receive a benefit from the purchases, although they are not directly involved
5
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3U.S. utility patents—the main
patent category, as contrasted with
other types such as plant
patents—must meet standards of use-
fulness, novelty, and nonobviousness.
“Nonobviousness” means the patented
technology must not be obvious to an
individual “skilled in the art.”
4Technology-transfer specialists
may define “technology transfer” as
“conversion of intellectual assets into
goods and services functional for end
users.” Some social-science research
emphasizes the types of actors
involved in domestic technology trans-
fer, for example the transfer of tech-
nology from the public to the private
sector, between private-sector institu-
tions, or between public-sector institu-
tions. In other studies, the term
“technology transfer” refers to the
transfer of technology among coun-
tries, in particular from industrialized
to less-developed nations. Different
definitions of technology transfer can
overlap. In this study we focus both on
the conversion of intellectual assets
and on the roles of the public and pri-
vate sectors.in the transactions that create the benefit. The same example generates a
“negative externality” if the transaction imposes costs on the neighbors:
pollen from the flowers might cause an allergic reaction, necessitating
medical expenses. 
Lack of competition is another potential source of market failure. A limited
number of sellers or buyers in a market may distort prices and keep the
volume of transactions below the efficient level, resulting in prices that are
too high and quantities exchanged that are too low compared with prices
and quantities in a competitive market. Antitrust law exists to prevent this
market failure. For example, the United States District Court of the District
of Columbia held in 1998 that Microsoft Corporation “could charge a price
for [the Windows operating system] substantially above that which could be
charged in a competitive market.”5 Additional competitors lower prices and
increase the total social benefit of the market (albeit at the expense of the
monopolist).
Markets might also fail to produce an efficient amount of a good when it is
“nonexcludable” or “nonrival” (or both). Nonexcludability and nonrivalry
are the two basic concepts used to define public goods. A nonexcludable
good can be consumed by anyone for free. In the earlier gardening example,
the homeowner cannot easily prevent people from enjoying the beauty of
the flowers. (The homeowner could erect a fence and charge admission to
the garden, so this particular good might be partially excludable.) Suppliers
of nonexcludable goods can have difficulty forcing consumers to pay, and
therefore nonexcludable goods are sometimes undersupplied. A nonrival
good is one that many people can consume without diminishing the
consumption of others, such as radio broadcasts and fireworks displays.
Precisely because nonrival goods can be enjoyed so broadly, markets can
undersupply them, which is socially inefficient.
The existence of market failures is often a basis for public intervention.
Intervention might take the form of a tax policy to discourage negative
externalities, a subsidy policy to encourage positive externalities, or antitrust
policy to increase competition. 
Public investments in research and development (R&D) are another
response to market failure. Public R&D generates new information, in the
form of scientific knowledge. Information is sometimes considered a pure
public good. It is nonrivalrous, in that information can be understood and
used by everyone simultaneously. It is also difficult to exclude, because
many ways exist to convey information inexpensively. Because it displays
both of these characteristics, information created by publicly provided R&D
is often considered a public good.
Public research also can address problems of market failure more directly.
Federal laboratories can research new technologies to reduce pollution
byproducts of manufacturing. The research is itself a public good, in the
sense that it generates information that is nonexcludable and nonrival. In
addition, the subject of the research is aimed at correcting a market failure
arising from the negative externalities of pollution.
6
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5(C.A.98-1232)Although universities, the Federal Government, and private firms all may
conduct research with some public-good aspects, universities often are
regarded as the primary source of public-good research. For much of their
history, U.S. universities emphasized engineering and applied technology
development more than they did basic research (Rosenberg and Nelson,
1994). Following World War II, U.S. universities became one of the world’s
most important sources of public-good research, a role consistent with the
market-failure paradigm (Bozeman, 2000).6 These two roles—provision of
information with public good externalities, and research in areas where
market failure is an issue—represent the public response to market failure in
this approach to technology transfer.
There are analytical approaches other than “market failure” to the study of
technology transfer. The “mission technology” paradigm “assumes that the
government should perform R&D in service of well-specified missions in
which there is a national interest not easily served by private R&D”
(Bozeman 2000). The pre-eminent example of mission-related technology
development in the U.S. is defense- and national security-related R&D.
Civil engineering or sponsorship of the National Armory—which helped in
the development of manufacturing techniques using interchangeable parts
and mass production—are among the earliest examples of research in
support of the military mission. Agricultural research and extension was
another relatively early example of mission-related research, with some
activities such as seed importation and classification carried out by the Agri-
culture Division of the Patent Office even before the establishment of the
U.S. Department of Agriculture in 1862 (Dupree, 1986; Hounshell, 1984;
Huffman and Evenson, 1993).7
Finally, the “cooperative technology policy” paradigm stresses cooperation
among industry, government, and universities, and cooperation among rival
firms in the development of precompetitive technologies (Larsen and
Wigand, 1987; Wigand and Frankwick, 1989; Link and Tassey, 1987). In
this paradigm, government can serve both as a research performer and as a
research broker, developing policies that affect industrial innovation. This
paradigm is based on the belief that government technology planning and
coordination can enhance innovation and productivity. The cooperative tech-
nology policy paradigm is one of the major factors behind the many policy
changes, including changes in IP policy, which began in the 1980s.
However, this paradigm is sometimes in conflict with the market failure
paradigm that characterizes many economists’ thinking on IP and tech-
nology transfer policy (Bozeman, 2000).8
The Economic Case for Intellectual
Property in Federal Technology Transfer
The objective of a Federal office of technology transfer (OTT) is to serve
the public interest by maximizing the value of Federal research.9 In many
cases, the public interest is best served by the publication and wide dissemi-
nation of Federal research, placing it in the public domain where anyone
can put it to use. However, when Federal research creates a product or tech-
nology with potential commercial applications, laws provide scope for
further development by private sector firms. In this way, the government can
7
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6In many instances, students of
research policy distinguish between
basic and applied research. However
“basic research” is not always identi-
cal with “public goods research,” nor
is “applied research” always identical
with “private goods research.” “Some
applied research serves to develop
public goods, and some basic research
results can be held as private goods
depending on how they are dissemi-
nated” (Just and Huffman, 2004). This
is part of the context for our remarks
on the development of pollution con-
trol technology, for example.
7Other currently important govern-
ment mission research areas are medi-
cine and public health, energy
production and conservation, and
space (Bozeman, 2000).
8In the “market failure” paradigm,
the government’s role is seen as resid-
ual; in the “cooperative technology pol-
icy” paradigm, the government plays a
considerably more active role in coordi-
nating research across sectors.
9The Stevenson-Wydler Act man-
dated “that all major Federal laborato-
ries establish an Office of Research
and Technology Applications to under-
take technology transfer activities”
(Jaffe and Lerner, 2001).pursue Federal research priorities and provide incentives for the develop-
ment of resulting technologies, and at the same time harness the economic
efficiency of market competition. 
Generally speaking, technology developed with the support of Federal
research is not immediately ready for commercialization. A technology
developed to the point of patentability might require further investments in
research and development before it can be marketable. A scientist may
patent a plant trait with beneficial agronomic properties, but it is unlikely
that the invention can succeed commercially unless it can be incorporated
into a crop variety with a competitive yield. Likewise, a patented mechan-
ical process or invention might work well at a small scale, but it might need
additional development to realize its benefits at a larger scale. Additional
research might be necessary to improve a technology and learn more about
its properties, or additional development effort might be necessary to inte-
grate the technology into a feasible production process. Commercialization
is the final step, incurring marketing and advertising costs along with
production costs.
When additional investments in research and development are necessary to
commercialize a patented technology, firms may be willing to pay money up
front to develop a technology that is expected to be profitable in the future.
The licensing fee they pay to a Federal OTT is usually only a small fraction
of all the investments they make before a technology breaks even: R&D
expenses, capital costs, marketing, and advertising are among them. Compa-
nies that invest are risking their capital and effort, and they must expect a
suitable return on their investment to be willing to license a technology.
Patents play an important part in increasing the perceived profitability of a
technology, since patents limit competition in the early stages of business
development.
Technology licensees face two distinct types of risk—”technology risk” and
“appropriation risk.” Technology risk is the chance that a technology can be
improved and developed into a feasible commercial product or process. The
technology must not merely work; it must be an improvement over available
alternatives for the additional expense of development to be worth the
investment. 
Appropriation risk is the likelihood that a company is able to reap profits
successfully from its investments in the new technology. After a released
technology is found to be profitable, competitive forces put pressure on
profits. Competitors might lower prices, or existing companies and new
entrants might try to imitate the new technology. In time, competitors can
try to “invent around” the technology to achieve the same result in a
different way. Other inventors might create further improvements to the
technology and capture market share and profits that way. In the long run,
new inventions, technologies, and changing production practices and
customer choices limit the possible profits even when a technology is
patented. If a commercial partner is not found, because the Federal Govern-
ment is not likely to bring the invention into commercial production, it is
improbable that the technology will have widespread impact.
8
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The Stevenson-Wydler Act reduces appropriation risk for potential licensees
by providing scope for patent protection of federally funded research. This
reduction in risk encourages the additional investments necessary for tech-
nology commercialization, and increases the likelihood that Federal research
can be transformed into commercial applications. Without patent protection,
appropriation risk is typically very high, especially if competitors are able to
learn from the additional investments made by the first developer. Patent
protection may help to solve the potential problem of “me too” developers.
If no one wants to develop the technology first because most of the profits
from the invention are earned by subsequent developers, even the first steps
toward eventual commercialization of the technology may be stymied.
The government has other means to transfer technology; one is by
publishing research.10 When an OTT believes that the best way to maximize
the value of Federal research is to issue licenses, it must balance the incen-
tives offered to licensees.11 Too much incentive can enrich licensees at the
expense of customers and consumers; too little incentive increases appropri-
ation risk and can result in the abandonment of development efforts and the
failure to commercialize the technology.
A carefully chosen licensing strategy might increase the probability that an
invention will be developed into a commercial product or process. What can
the Federal Government do to increase incentives for potential technology
partners to take out a license? Additional research support can mitigate tech-
nology risk. Federal researchers, along with the OTT, can offer more inte-
grated licensing and research support, perhaps conducting additional testing
and extensions of the original research. The original inventor is the most
skilled practitioner of the research, and, following mutual agreement, can
support product developers with further testing or research. An OTT also
may reduce the terms of a technology license, lowering licensing fees.
Sometimes an OTT might opt to attenuate licensee incentives. Since reducing
technology risk benefits licensees, the OTT might be able to negotiate more
demanding terms in license agreements, for example through higher licensing
fees. An OTT might also choose to diversify the technology risk across more
than one licensee by choosing nonexclusive licenses, co-exclusive licenses, or
licenses exclusive by territory or field of use. Although the definition of these
terms often remains loose, nonexclusive licenses12 are freely granted to as
many parties as wish to negotiate them. Co-exclusive licenses may be offered
in overlapping fields or territories, but only to a limited number of entities.
Licenses exclusive by territory or field of use are issued to different entities in
nonoverlapping territories or fields13 (see box, “Varying Degrees of License
Exclusivity”).
Technology development and commercialization can fail for a variety of
reasons—lack of financial capital, poorly suited human capital such as a scien-
tific research staff with limited knowledge of the particular area of technology,
bad luck, etc.—so a greater number of technology partners might increase the
chances that one of them can successfully commercialize the technology.
Offsetting this reduction in risk is the greater appropriation risk for licensees
when licensing is open to multiple firms. Less exclusive licensing need not
exacerbate appropriability risk: a sufficiently profitable market may be able to 
10These means, and reasons for
choosing among them, will be dis-
cussed further in this report.
11In patent law, a license is a 
written authority granted by the owner
of a patent to another legal person,
empowering the latter to make or use
the patented product or process under
certain restrictions.
12Nonexclusive licenses are occa-
sionally referred to as “open licenses.”
13These licenses are occasionally
referred to as “multiple exclusive
licenses.”support numerous licenses. Licensing the same technology to different 
industries or to different industry segments may create additional markets for a
technology and increase its value to society.
Flexible licensing approaches also can reduce risk. For example, high
upfront licensing fees or high royalty rates might appear sustainable at early
stages of commercialization (see the chapter “Technology Transfer by
Federal Agencies”). If the technology reveals itself to be more difficult to
develop or the market is less profitable than originally thought, the OTT can
revise the terms of a license to maintain technology partner involvement.
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Varying Degrees of License Exclusivity
A patent’s value stems from its ability to limit competition and thereby increase profits due to the scarcity value of the
patented invention. The value of a patent license is therefore related to the extent to which it excludes competitors.
Exclusivity is not an absolute, however, but rather exists on a scale. When the Federal Government obtains a patent on
its research, it determines the degree of exclusivity in part by how it licenses the patent. Factors such as appropriability
risk and market contestability also are relevant to the scarcity value of a technology.
Patent license exclusivity
Exclusivity Type of license
Least exclusive Publication Research is published into the public domain; invention
becomes unpatentable and free for anyone to use.
Nonexclusive licensing The Federal Government obtains patent rights, but licenses 
the patent to any interested party.
Co-exclusive licensing The Federal Government obtains patent rights, but offers a 
limited number of licenses that may be in overlapping fields
or territories.
Licensing exclusive by The Federal Government obtains patent rights, but offers a
territory or field of use set (usually small) limited number of licenses in nonoverlapping 
territories or fields.
Sole exclusive licensing The Federal Government obtains patent rights, but offers
only one license. As in all other cases, the Federal 
Government retains its own ability to use the invention.
Most exclusive No licensing Some technologies are not available for license on any terms. 
Examples include military weapons and nuclear power
technology.
Source: ERS analysis.Technology Transfer by Federal Agencies
Federal Guidelines for Technology Transfer
Between 1980 and 2003, the U.S. Federal research budget grew from $66.7
billion to $119.6 billion in real terms and represented nearly 30 percent of
all R&D investments—public and private (table 1). More than half of the
total was allocated to defense-related research. Of nondefense R&D
spending, human health research represented 20 percent in 1980—growing
to nearly 50 percent by 2003. NASA and the Department of Energy repre-
sent the next largest shares of nondefense R&D spending. Federal agricul-
tural research spending grew from $1.4 billion (4.1 percent of nondefense
R&D) to $2.37 billion (4.3 percent of nondefense R&D) in 2003.
What do these investments in research accomplish? Most of the research
investments by the Federal Government are to support specific mission
areas, e.g., military objectives, advances in basic health-related issues, and
space exploration. Often there are scientific discoveries made in the process
of carrying out the mission-oriented research that if made available to the
private sector, with additional developmental research, may result in
commercially viable products. Computed axial tomography (CAT) and
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) medical scanning technology, freeze-
dried foods, and cordless power tools are examples of products derived from
investments in the space program that benefited American consumers once
the technology became commercially viable. These products are often
11
Government Patenting and Technology Transfer/ERR-15
Economic Research Service/USDA
Table 1
Federal research and development (R&D) expenditures by agency, selected years, 1980-20031
Agency FY 1980 FY 1985 FY 1990 FY 1995 FY 2000 FY 2003
$ millions
Department of Defense 28,317 49,251 49,983 41,124 42,853 60,074
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 10,589 5,485 9,386 11,004 10,182 10,822
Department of Energy 11,651 9,208 9,223 7,464 7,460 8,565
Department of Health and Human Services 7,687 8,474 11,262 13,399 19,498 28,059
National Institutes of Health2 6,958 8,109 10,701 12,520 18,482 26,744
National Science Foundation  1,842 2,186 2,282 2,787 3,143 3,978
Department of Agriculture  1,444 1,543 1,615 1,730 1,904 2,373
Department of the Interior  828 599 701 777 663 652
Department of Transportation  802 676 467 775 651 709
Environmental Protection Agency  691 471 560 645 598 575
Department of Commerce  723 603 597 1,301 1,259 1,213
Department of Homeland Security  0 0 0 0 0 747
Department of Veterans Affairs 275 330 288 306 692 828
Other 1,888 854 1,336 1,227 931 1,078
Total R&D 66,735 79,678 87,700 82,539 89,834 119,672
Defense R&D 31,162 53,465 54,086 44,014 46,286 64,544
Nondefense R&D 35,573 26,213 33,614 38,525 43,548 55,127
Note: Constant dollar conversions based on OMB’s gross domestic product deflators from the FY 2005 budget.
1Years are fiscal years (FY), from October 1-September 30.
2The National Institutes of Health are part of the Department of Health and Human Services; the HHS numbers include the NIH ones.
Source: American Association for the Advancement of Science Reports I through XXIX, based on Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
and agency R&D budget data, including conduct of R&D and R&D facilities.referred to as “spinoffs” from the space or other programs. Recognizing the
potential benefits to business, industry, and consumers from federally
funded scientific and technical advances, the government has developed
considerable legislation over time to facilitate transfer of discoveries from
the public to the private sector.
Federal involvement in technology transfer stems from several concerns.
The government needs specific goods and services for its various missions,
and those goods and services often cannot be purchased directly in the
marketplace. Contracting, cooperation, and licensing arrangements between
Federal labs and private industry facilitate the development of products the
government needs. A key example is military equipment produced by
private contractors. Cooperation between Federal labs and private firms also
provides government researchers with access to state-of-the-art technical
developments. But the chief reason for Federal involvement in technology
transfer is to promote technological development and change that can spur
economic growth. Technological change has been credited with responsi-
bility for one-quarter of the economic growth in the U.S. economy during
the last half of the last century and has been a major source of long-term
economic growth and welfare (Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000).
There are three hypothesized goals of Federal technology transfer policy:
(1) To bring the benefits of public R&D to potential users. One of the
motivating factors behind technology transfer policy was concern that
too many publicly developed technologies were useful, but unused. The
Bayh-Dole Act “constituted a congressional endorsement of the argu-
ment that failure to establish patent protection over the results of federal-
ly funded university research would limit the commercial exploitation of
these results” (Mowery et al., 2001).
(2) To draw on private sector resources when possible, as the public
sector shifts resources to areas in which it has a comparative advantage.
In U.S. agriculture, for example, the public agricultural research system
has been characterized by a decentralized State-led structure, which fos-
ters geographically specific applied research (Schultz, 1971; Huffman
and Evenson, 1993). Public and private entities cooperated closely, with
the public sector playing a strong applied research role. However, influ-
ential reports published by the National Academy of Sciences (1972)
and by the Rockefeller Foundation (1982) argued that agricultural
research had become overly focused on applied research, and had moved
too far from the cutting edge of biological research. Since that time,
many public agricultural research institutions have sought to pass more
applied work to the private sector, and focus instead on basic research
and applied research with strong public-good characteristics. Technology
transfer has offered public research institutions an opportunity for pri-
vate firms to assume certain forms of applied research and development.
(3) To allow public institutions to influence the development of new
technologies. Like other industries, agricultural production offers bene-
fits to society, but it may also impose certain externalities. Technology
transfer offers public institutions an opportunity to promote the develop-
ment of technologies that increase agriculture’s benefits to society or
mitigate the costs of agricultural production (Fuglie et al., 1996).
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Key Legislation
Prior to the 1980s only about 5 percent of federally owned patents were
being licensed and used by the private sector. While many patented tech-
nologies held by the public sector are specific to Federal mission needs and
may have no commercial potential, it was nonetheless felt that there were
unexploited discoveries within the public sector that could benefit the
private sector and, as a result, the general public. Also, most Federal agen-
cies would take title to discoveries made with Federal funds—regardless of
who made the discovery—and then would only license the patents with
nonexclusive licenses. Without ownership of the technology, or at least a
partially exclusive license, private firms had little incentive to develop and
commercialize the technologies. To remedy these concerns, two key pieces
of legislation were enacted with the explicit purpose of getting Federal
research from the lab into the market: The Patent and Trademark Act (P.L.
96-517), referred to as the Bayh-Dole Act, and the Stevenson-Wydler Tech-
nology Innovation Act (P.L. 96-480). The purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act was
to create a uniform national policy (out of the 26 different agency policies)
to minimize bureaucratic inconsistency and encourage private industry to
invest in the commercial development of federally produced research. The
legislation would allow universities, nonprofit institutions, and small busi-
nesses to obtain patents arising from research that was funded with Federal
funds. This law allowed these entities to derive royalties from their patents,
which then would support further research and enhance the return on their
investment. The Stevenson-Wydler Act was similarly designed to encourage
the use of federally funded research through technology transfer. Transfer is
achieved by transferring legal rights (licensing), assigning patent title to
private contractors, or through personal interactions. Both Acts also encour-
aged the licensing of technologies to small businesses.
The Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-502), which amended
the Stevenson-Wydler Act, permitted the use of cooperative research and
development agreements (CRADAs). A CRADA is a legal document that
defines a collaborative venture between a government lab and another entity,
e.g., a university or private firm.14 The Bayh-Dole Act permits nongovern-
ment cooperators in a CRADA to receive title to an invention. The Federal
Technology Transfer Act also increased employee incentives by including
technology transfer in performance evaluations (see box, “U.S. Legislation
Governing Patenting and Transfer of Federally Funded R&D”).
14Throughout this report, the term
CRADA is used to refer to the specific
legal mechanism described in the
Stevenson-Wydler Act, and not to
more general cooperative research
efforts.14
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U.S. Legislation Governing Patenting and Transfer of
Federally Funded R&D
Since 1980, Congress has enacted a series of laws to promote technology
transfer and to provide technology transfer mechanisms and incentives. These
laws and related executive orders encourage the dissemination of new knowl-
edge and foster the development of commercial technologies. Sharing between
federal laboratories and private industry can include not only technologies, but
personnel, facilities, methods, expertise, and technical information in general.
The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act (1980) required Federal
laboratories to facilitate the transfer of federally owned and originated tech-
nology to State and local governments and the private sector. The act required
offices of technology transfer in Federal agencies and established budgeting and
reporting requirements.
The Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Act (1980) permitted
government grantees and contractors to retain title to federally funded inven-
tions and encouraged universities to license inventions to industry. The act is
designed to foster interactions between academia and the business community. 
The Small Business Innovation Development Act (1982) established the
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program within the major Federal
R&D agencies to increase government funding of research that has commer-
cialization potential within small high-technology companies. 
The National Cooperative Research Act (1984) encouraged U.S. firms to
collaborate on generic, precompetitive research by establishing a rule of reason
for evaluating the antitrust implications of research joint ventures.The act was
amended in 1993 by the National Cooperative Research and Production Act
(NCRPA), which let companies collaborate on production activities as well as
research activities. 
The Federal Technology Transfer Act (1986) amended the Stevenson-Wydler
Technology Innovation Act to authorize cooperative research and development
agreements (CRADAs) between Federal laboratories and other entities,
including state agencies. 
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (1988) established the
Competitiveness Policy Council to develop recommendations for national
strategies and specific policies to enhance industrial competitiveness. The act
created the Advanced Technology Program and the Manufacturing Technology
Centers within the National Institute for Standards and Technology to help U.S.
companies become more competitive. 
The National Competitiveness Technology Transfer Act (1989) amended the
Stevenson-Wydler Act to allow government-owned, contractor-operated labora-
tories to enter into CRADAs. 
The National Cooperative Research and Production Act (1993) relaxed
restrictions on cooperative production activities, enabling research joint venture
participants to work together in the application of technologies they jointly
acquire. 
The Technology Transfer Commercialization Act (2000) amended the
Stevenson-Wydler Act and the Bayh-Dole Act to improve the ability of govern-
ment agencies to monitor and license federally owned inventions.
Source: Science and Engineering Indicators 2004, National Science Foundation.Federal Agency Use of Intellectual Property
The changes in technology transfer policies for federally funded, as well as
federally performed research, outlined in the previous section, were one of
four major changes in U.S. intellectual property policy that began in the
1980s.15 The economic effects of these policy changes have been complex
and not always well understood, although it is clear that both private and
public sector institutions have responded to shifts in policy (Jaffe, 2000).
Public data on patents are available from the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO), and more detailed information on invention disclosures,
patenting, and licensing is available from the U.S. Department of
Commerce. Available data suggest that although the level of patenting by
Federal agencies has remained essentially unchanged for the past 25 years
or more, the incidence of technology transfer from the Federal Government
to the private sector has increased markedly with the passage of the Bayh-
Dole, Stevenson-Wydler, and other technology transfer amendments.16
From 1976 through 2003, the number of patents issued each year to all
Federal agencies and laboratories remained essentially unchanged (fig. 1).
The total number of patents granted in all sectors grew about 140 percent
over this period. The most striking change was for U.S. universities, for
which issued patents increased 1,164 percent over this period. During this
entire period, it should be noted that U.S. private sector patents consistently
averaged 95 percent of the total issued to all U.S.-based institutions (fig. 1;
USPTO). Patenting by the U.S. Department of Agriculture shrank from over
6 percent of the Federal total to about 3 percent by the mid-1980s, but has
risen back to 5 or 6 percent today (figs. 2 and 3).
Issued patents are only one measure of the disclosure of research informa-
tion by Federal entities. In recent years, Department of Commerce tech-
nology transfer data show positive trends for many indicators for the 10
largest government research agencies (unfortunately, in this source, issued
patents were only recorded from 1997 and active licenses from 1999.)17 For
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15The others were the creation of
the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (CAFC) specifically to review
patent decisions; the extension of
patent rights to new technological
areas; and agreements under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) to harmonize IP policy
worldwide.
16Market structure in the relevant
industries likely to license technolo-
gies may differ from Federal agency to
Federal agency. For example, the phar-
maceutical industry, a likely recipient
of National Institutes of Health (NIH)
research, consists of large firms but is
less consolidated than the agricultural
biotechnology sector. Although USDA
licenses relatively little to the narrowly
defined agricultural biotechnology
industry, agricultural markets are
sometimes niche markets, served by
relatively few firms, even if the firms
are not large.
17In contrast to the patent data in
the preceding paragraph, which were
derived directly from the U.S. PTO,
these data come specifically from
technology transfer reporting by the
Department of Commerce.
Patents issued to U.S. assignees
Figure 1
Source: ERS calculations based on U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) data. 
Patents issued
    (log scale)








All patents issued, U.S. and non-U.S. institutions
U.S. private 
U.S. university
Total Federal these agencies, the number of inventions disclosed grew from 2,662 in 1987
to 3,909 in 2001 (table 2).18 Patent applications grew from 848 in 1987 to
2,172 in 2001. More than half of all inventive activity as measured by inven-
tion disclosures arises from the Departments of Energy and Defense. USDA
invention disclosures have been more modest, with 83 in 1987, 260 in 1997,
and 118 in 2001. The licensing of patents by Federal agencies also grew
considerably over this period. The number of new licenses issued by all
agencies grew from 128 in 1987 to 578 in 2001. The number of active
licenses was 3,142 in 2001.19 The number of new licenses from the USDA
each year was around 20 to 30 over this period. The total number of active
USDA licenses was 255 in 2001. The use of CRADAs by all agencies also
16
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18An invention disclosure contains
information about new inventions and
discoveries that help intellectual prop-
erty managers determine if a patent
application is necessary.
19License terms, including the
length of the license, are subject to
negotiation. Furthermore, licenses are
sometimes abandoned (see below). A
theoretical limit for the license of a
patented technology is the patent term
of 20 years.







USDA and Federal patenting
Figure 2
Patents issued 
  (log scale)













USDA patenting as a percentage of all Federal patenting 
Figure 3
Percent
Source: ERS calculations based on USPTO data. 
USDA percent of Federal grew over this period, from 34 active CRADAs for the 10 major agencies in
1987 to 3,603 in 2001. The number of active USDA CRADAs grew from 9
to well over 200 during the same period. 
These indicators suggest that although changes in IP policy have not led to a
rapid upsurge of patenting by the Federal Government, in contrast to the
trends for the private sector and particularly universities, the incidence of tech-
nology transfer from the Federal Government to the private sector has
increased with the passage of the Bayh-Dole, Stevenson-Wydler, and other
technology transfer amendments. As we have noted, the purpose of these laws
is to transfer technology—not to raise funds for the Federal Government
through licensing. Licensing income for the whole Federal Government was
$5.8 million in 1987 and grew to $69.5 million in 2000—the last year for
which we have data on Federal licensing revenue. The total Federal R&D
budget in 2000 was $89.8 billion, which overshadowed the income from
licenses. USDA license income grew from $133,000 in 1987 to $2.5 million in
2000, only about 0.3 percent of the total ARS R&D budget of $885 million. In
both cases, license income is not a complete measure of the benefits of public
sector investments in science and technology; it is merely a reflection of the
amount of technology being transferred through licensing agreements.20
Licensing patents to firms is often desirable for agencies because the contracts
bind the firms to developing and utilizing the technology, thus diffusing it into
the marketplace. License fees also serve as a way to screen out firms with
insufficient ability or interest to develop the licensed technology. License fees
impose costs that a successful firm can expect to recoup in product sales, while
discouraging unsuccessful firms from going forward. If the technology is
successfully commercialized, the firm’s resulting profits and the consumer
benefits from the technology are the major direct economic benefits from the
original research. This aspect of licensing is an important incentive that
furthers the technology transfer mission, outweighing the importance of the
total licensing revenues collected relative to the Federal R&D budget.
17
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20The benefits to investment in
R&D are difficult to measure and have
been the subject of considerable
research, (see Mansfield, 1977, 1991,
or Alston et al., 1995 for excellent
expositions on this research).
Nonetheless, estimates of the rate of
return to public agricultural research
have had a wide range, with medians
of around 50 percent to 60 percent.
Even after adjusting for potential
biases, the U.S. rate of return has
likely been around 35 percent, indicat-
ing large public benefits (Fuglie et al.,
1996; see also Alston et al., 2000 and
Evenson, 2001 for worldwide esti-
mates).18










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Technology Transfer at the Agricultural
Research Service (ARS)
The U.S. Department of Agriculture has a long history of close collabora-
tion with private agricultural industries, in part because public agricultural
research has in the past been more applied in nature than other types of
public research (Fuglie et al., 1996). Still, new mechanisms for public-
private collaboration in research have had a significant impact at the agency.
ARS has increased technology transfer to the private sector considerably in
the last decade (table 3). All three goals of Federal technology transfer
policy—bringing the benefits of public R&D to potential users, finding
innovative ways to fulfill the agency mission in an era of relatively scarce
resources, and influencing the direction of technology development—may
have played a role in this expansion of technology transfer.21
Alternatives and Complements in ARS
Technology Transfer Policy
Patents and Licensing
Patents are both an old and a new means of technology transfer. The Federal
laboratories have long had the option of patenting innovations, but before 1980
only nonexclusive licenses could be granted. Passage of the Stevenson-Wydler
Act in 1980 allowed Federal laboratories to issue exclusive licenses to patents
19
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21Actual implementation of Federal
technology transfer policy may differ
from agency to agency. For example,
ARS has a relatively small research
budget and a single coordinated tech-
nology transfer program. The National
Institutes of Health (NIH) have a large
research budget, but also a coordinated
technology transfer program.
Department of Energy labs, on the
other hand, are often run by different
contractors, and these labs differ in,
for example, the extent to which
employees are encouraged to pursue
commercially relevant activities.
Table 3
USDA technology transfer activities
Patents Patent license Active Value of
Year awarded royalties CRADAs1 CRADAs2
Number Million Number Million
dollars dollars
1987 34 0.09 9 1.6
1988 28 0.10 48 8.7
1989 47 0.42 86 15.6
1990 42 0.57 145 18.9
1991 57 0.83 181 17.1
1992 56 1.0 172 15.0
1993 57 1.5 172 50.5
1994 40 1.4 208 32.9
1995 38 1.6 229 33.2
1996 53 2.1 244 98.9
1997 35 2.3 273 155.5
1998 57 2.4 271 120.2
1999 74 2.4 298 136.7
2000 64 2.6 257 125.1
2001 64 2.62 219 117.9
2002 53 2.57 225 114.7
2003 64 2.29 229 84.8
2004 205 89.0
1Number of Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) with the private sector.
2Value of CRADAs includes the total value of USDA and private-sector resources committed to active
CRADAs over their lifetime.
Sources: Agricultural Research Service, USDA; Cooperative State Research, Education, and
Extension Service, USDA.on their inventions. In ARS, the decision to apply for a patent is taken by a
Patent Review Committee, working in conjunction with the inventor and a
patent advisor (see box, “The Patent Review Committee”).
ARS structures its total licensing fees such that they partially cover the tech-
nology transfer program costs. Licensing fees are not used to fund
research.22 The individual inventor(s) receives a percentage of the fee,
usually 25 percent, and the remainder goes toward defraying the costs of
patenting and licensing 23
While patenting and licensing are the focus of this report, there are other
mechanisms for transferring technologies developed within the Federal
Government. The multiple means used by ARS to transfer technologies are
not mutually exclusive. For example, for a given technology, several aspects
may be reported in scientific publications; another aspect may be the subject
of a patent application; and a licensed patent may be further developed
through a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement, or CRADA
(described in the next section).
Publications and Networking Among Scientists
The traditional means of scientific exchange, publications, are ARS’s primary
means of conveying the results of its research. Scientists publish results of their
research both within ARS and through external organizations, such as refereed
journals or books and book chapters produced by academic and commercial
publishers. Internal publications may be specialized, but also include less
technical newsletters and reports for nonspecialists.
Researchers, whether Federal, academic, or private, attend many of the same
professional conferences. Through such conferences and through the litera-
ture associated with particular fields of study, private sector scientists are
informed about the activities of their public sector counterparts (and vice
versa). This familiarity often leads to informal relationships that contribute
to technology transfer. We observed these relationships in several of our
case studies.24
TEKTRAN
ARS informs potential cooperators of research advances through announce-
ments at workshops and conferences, advertisements in the Federal
Register, electronic postings, and an Internet database Technology Transfer
Automated Retrieval System (TEKTRAN). Maintained by ARS, the data-
base reports research findings that have been peer-reviewed and cleared by
ARS management. TEKTRAN summaries are synopses of published or
soon-to-be-published articles describing recent research (though some
summaries are excluded to protect potential patents before publication).
Thus, the summaries can help potential technology transferees identify new
innovations. 
The ARS Office of Technology Transfer also posts available technologies
(whether protected by patent, the subject of a patent application, or other)
on its website.
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22Table 2 shows that in FY 2000,
the mean annual revenue per license
for ARS was just over $11,000. For all
10 Federal agencies reported in that
table, the mean annual revenue per
license was around $23,000. In the
same fiscal year, universities and other
academic institutions reported a mean
annual revenue per license of about
$60,000 (AUTM, 2002). As table 4
will show, many ARS licenses do not
generate revenue in a given year, and
the distribution of license revenue is
skewed, with mean annual revenue
higher than median annual revenue.
This kind of skewed license revenue
distribution is typical of other Federal
agencies and academic institutions as
well. Revenue data for licensing from
private sector technology owners are
usually not publicly available.
23ARS inventors also receive the
first $2,000 in licensing revenue.
24In the economics of science, infor-
mal networking is one basis for the
assumption that knowledge spillovers
have a geographic component.21
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The Patent Review Committee:
How ARS Decides To Patent An Invention
At ARS, the patent process begins when an invention report is submitted by
an ARS scientist. Each scientist has an assigned patent adviser, who is avail-
able for consultations regarding issues of patentability. Invention reports are
submitted through the scientist’s line managers, who approve the invention
for patent filing, subject to the recommendation of a Patent Review
Committee. Each committee consists of ARS scientists and representatives
of the Office of Technology Transfer, who participate in the discussions as
nonvoting members.
For each invention report submitted, a Patent Review Committee considers the
following questions in deciding whether to recommend patent protection:
(1) Is there current commercial interest in the invention or a high proba-
bility of commercialization in the future?
(2) Is the magnitude of the market relative to the costs of commercializa-
tion large enough to warrant a patent?
(3) Would a patent likely play a significant role in transferring the tech-
nology to the user?
(4) Would a patent be enforceable; i.e., is the invention drawn to, or does it
employ, a unique and readily identifiable material or device which could
be bought or sold?
(5) Is the invention of sufficient scope to justify patenting?
The committee can recommend to “approve,” “defer,” or “suspend”” an
invention report. “Approve” means that a patent application should be filed.
“Defer” means that the invention report is sent back to the scientist for some
specific additional information. Often, the committee recommends seeking
potential commercial partners in order to be able to respond to the first
question above. “Suspend” means that patent protection will not be sought,
and information about the invention will be distributed through some other
means, such as scientific publication.
After an invention report is approved, a patent application is prepared and
submitted to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and licensees are
sought. Prior to granting an exclusive license, a notice must be published in
the Federal Register, with a comment period during which objections may
be raised. If more than one U.S. business would like to obtain a license, co-
exclusive licenses, or multiple licenses in different fields or territories, may
be granted. There is a preference for small businesses if they are as qualified
to receive the license as a larger company is.
Source: Office of Technology Transfer, Agricultural Research Service,
USDA.Cooperative Agreements
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) are a tool
for formally linking government and industry researchers. This program,
authorized under the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, allows
Federal laboratories and businesses to form commercial partnerships that
help move new technologies into the marketplace. ARS scientists and
companies work together to develop a research plan that is consistent with
the agency’s mission. Under a CRADA, ARS scientists collaborate with
outside institutions (e.g., private firms) to help commercialize technologies. 
With CRADAs, both sides may contribute inhouse research resources such
as personnel, equipment, and laboratory privileges. The non-Federal collab-
orator may provide the Federal laboratory with research funds; however,
Federal laboratories do not provide financial resources to non-Federal part-
ners (Congressional Research Service, 1991). Patents resulting from a
CRADA may be jointly owned. In cases where the Federal laboratory
retains title, the non-Federal partner has first right to negotiate an exclusive
license. Some data also may not be publicly disclosed for a certain amount
of time. 
CRADAs are generally initiated by ARS scientists (W. Phelps, personal
communication, 1997). According to USDA technology transfer officials,
the guidelines for these arrangements are that the research must be consis-
tent with the agency’s mission, that there be no conflicts of interest, and that
fairness be shown to potential cooperators (D.J. Blalock, personal communi-
cation, 1997).
Other Means of Protecting and Transferring Technologies
ARS also has used Plant Variety Protection Certificates (PVPCs) to protect its
innovations. PVPCs allow for the use of the variety in breeding programs
without permission of the holder and permit farmers and growers to save seeds
for their own use; thus, they are less likely to be licensed.25 Most of the plant
variety protection certificates are held with State agricultural experiment
stations.
ARS scientists use material transfer agreements (MTAs) when they want to
provide material to someone outside of ARS but also want to maintain control
over the material. This agreement states specifically what the material is and
what it can be used for, restricts giving it to a third party without permission,
and prohibits commercial use of the material. All MTAs are reviewed by an
ARS technology transfer coordinator.
In some cases, ARS must share certain confidential information with a
company to determine if there is sufficient mutual interest to proceed with a
CRADA and/or a patent license. A confidentiality agreement is used to prevent
public disclosure of potentially patentable innovations. 
Trends in ARS Patenting
The “Technology Transfer by Federal Agencies” chapter demonstrated that as
the number of U.S. utility patents increased rapidly over the past 25 to 30
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25The intellectual property regime
for cultivars of commercial crops
includes plant patents for asexually
reproduced crops, dating to 1930,
PVPCs, dating to 1970, and utility
patents, first formally recognized in
1985. See Fuglie et al. (1996).
Although ARS holds utility patents
across a wide range of agricultural
technologies, it has only occasionally
used IP protection of any kind for cul-
tivars.23
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years, the number of patents issued to Federal Government and affiliated
research agencies held relatively steady.26 This implied a decline in the already
small percentage of total patents issued to Federal labs. Over the same period,
the number of patents issued to ARS fluctuated, although from 1985 onward
there has been a fairly strong upward trend in these patents. Nonetheless, the
rate of increase in the number of patents issued to ARS (4.4 percent annually
from 1985 through 2003) was not as great as the rate of increase in total
patents issued (5.1 percent annually over the same period).
There seems to be little evidence that over time technology transfer via
patenting and licensing has come at the expense of publishing as the traditional
means for disseminating research results from ARS. Figure 4 compares ARS
patent counts from 1990–2003 with publication counts over the same period.
Patent counts, which are much lower in absolute terms, are normalized by 100
scientist years, and publication counts by scientist years.27, 28 This is done to
give trends a common denominator for easy comparison. Publication counts,
taken from the Institute for Scientific Information’s Current Contents database,
identified all publications for which at least one author had “ARS” or “Agricul-
tural Research Service” as an affiliation. Around 1998, ARS patent counts rose
somewhat, while publication counts dipped slightly for several years before
rising slightly again. However, even with this increase in patenting, ARS was
granted roughly 60 to 80 patents a year, at the same time that scientists with
ARS affiliations were partially or fully responsible for roughly 4,000 or more
publications annually.29 Normalization by scientist years suggests that
output/input ratios have not decreased over time for publications even as
patenting has increased. Normalization by ARS budgets, not shown here, also
supports this conclusion. Recent empirical studies of the relationships between
patenting and publishing in the life sciences (Azoulay et al., 2005; Murray and
Stern, 2005) suggest that patenting and publishing can be complementary. The
ARS data are consistent with these findings.
Patenting at USDA versus Other Public Agricultural
Institutions
Within the U.S. public sector agricultural research system, the land grant
universities could be considered to be the State level counterpart to ARS.
Comparing changes in the numbers of patents issued to both sets of institutions
gives a sense of the relative importance different institutions give to patenting.
The available data indicate that in recent years ARS patenting has increased
only modestly when compared with university patenting, whether or not the
universities are land grants. This is completely consistent with the modest
changes in all Federal patenting compared with university patenting (see
chapter titled “Technology Transfer by Federal Agengies”). It is difficult to
disentangle patents applicable to agriculture from general biological patents,
but the available data suggest that university biological patenting that may have
agricultural applications also grew much more rapidly than ARS patenting.
It is important to note that many patents issued to land grant universities fall
outside the area of agriculture. Large research universities such as the Univer-
sity of California-Berkeley or the University of Wisconsin have many other
subject areas in their patentable research portfolios. It is also important to note
that it is usually not possible to determine whether a patent has potential agri-
cultural applications without looking at the individual patent. For example,
26In the USPTO database patents
resulting in part from ARS research
are assigned to “the United States of
America as represented by the
Secretary of Agriculture.” In some
cases, such patents could have other
assignees as well, for example, univer-
sities that also participated in the
research.
27Patent and publication counts
could also be normalized by ARS’s
real budget. There is also a question of
lags—what is the average length of
time between initial research invest-
ment and output in the form of publi-
cations, a patent, or both? In fact, for
both scientist years and budgetary
measures, incorporation of a 5-year
lag suggested greater increases in per
scientist year output, over the period
reported here, for both publications
and patents.
28A scientist year is the work done
by a person who has responsibility for
designing, planning, administering,
and conducting research in 1 year (i.e.,
2,080 hours).
29We examined publication counts
using the AGRICOLA database of the
National Agricultural Library. Changes
in catalogues over time have hampered
the creation of a consistent, long-term
time series of ARS publication counts
in this database. Using the search
terms “Agricultural Research Service”
or “ARS” in several different ways
showed no particular secular trend in
publication counts in this database,
either.USPTO classifications 435 (molecular biology and microbiology) and 800
(multicellular living organisms) are two important codes that may have poten-
tial medical applications, agricultural applications, or both.30
In any case, the rate of increase in patenting by land grant universities over the
period since 1976 is striking. Although the number of patents issued to the land
grant universities appears to have leveled off somewhat in recent years, from
1985 to 2003 this figure rose at an average annual rate of 11.2 percent,
compared with the average annual rate of 4.4 percent for USDA patents (fig.
5). Furthermore, patenting in biologically related categories grew faster than
in many other areas. The USPTO (2002) has published a breakdown of
patents issued to all universities, and to individual research universities in
the top 100, by patent class and by date of application (as opposed to date
of issue). Before 1980, less than 5 percent of all patent applications by top
research universities were in classes 435 and 800. By the mid- to late 1990s,
over 20 percent were in these classes. We looked at annual growth rates in
university patent applications for easily identifiable biological classes—
primarily 435 and 800 but also including several more traditional agricul-
tural categories. Over the 1980s and early 1990s, these growth rates were
very high (13 percent to 20 percent or more) whether universities were land
grants with significant medical research expenditures, land grants with little
to no medical research, non-land grants with significant medical research, or
non-land grants with little to no medical research. This suggests that univer-
sity biological patenting with potential agricultural applicability grew
rapidly whether or not it was primarily medical in intent.
Patenting of Agricultural Biotechnologies
The Economic Research Service (ERS) and other research partners have
recently completed the first phase of an online database of agricultural
biotechnology intellectual property (ABIP). One major component is a data-
base of U.S. agricultural biotechnology utility patents issued from
1976–2000. Agricultural biotechnology was broadly defined to refer to
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30In some cases biological research
findings that might be patented under
these classifications originally may
have been directed at medical applica-
tions, but might have potential agricul-
tural uses as well.












ARS patents and publications, normalized by scientist years 
Figure 4
Normalized counts
Source:ERS calculations based on USPTO, Institute for Scientific Information (ISI) Current 
Contents, and USDA Current Research Information System (CRIS) data. 
Publications/SY
Patents/100SYgeneral biological processes in agriculture and food. The selection proce-
dure was designed to include patents not only for genetically engineered
agricultural plants or animals, or the processes used to produce such geneti-
cally engineered species, but also for research processes such as tissue
culture, research tools with potential applications to agriculture, crop vari-
eties produced via biotechnologies other than genetic engineering, and other
biological processes (such as fermentation) used in the food and nutrition
industries. The database also features a rule-based classification scheme that
allows alternative, narrower definitions of agricultural biotechnology, for
example, genetic transformation technologies (King and Heisey, 2003;
2004).
Agricultural biotechnology patenting has grown at a faster rate than the rate
of utility patenting in general. Figure 6 shows, in logarithmic scale, changes
over time in agricultural biotechnology patents issued to various U.S. based
institutions: U.S. private companies, U.S. universities (land grant and non-
land grant), and U.S. Government.31 Most of the U.S. Government agricul-
tural biotechnology patents were issued to ARS. For comparative purposes,
the time series for all patents, “biotech” and “non-biotech,” issued to ARS is
also shown.
It is clear from figure 6 that (especially since the mid-1980s), agricultural
biotechnology patenting has grown rapidly in all U.S.-based sectors. Over
certain periods, it appears to have grown even faster for universities than for
private sector firms. Agricultural biotechnology patenting by ARS has
grown somewhat more slowly than it has for the other two U.S. sectors.
However, biotechnology patenting by ARS has grown much more rapidly
than ARS patenting in general. Thus, since the mid- to the late 1980s it has
occupied an increasing share of ARS’s patent portfolio.
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31The database also includes U.S.
utility patents issued to non-U.S. insti-
tutions, but these are omitted as sepa-
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Percentage growth rate in utility patents awarded, 1985-2003
Figure 5
PercentThe area of agricultural biotechnology that has received the most public atten-
tion, genetic transformation of plants, comprises a relatively limited proportion
of ARS patents. Figure 7 compares patenting in genetic transformation and
plant technologies with total agricultural biotech patents as defined in the ABIP
database.32 Patents that fall under both the “genetic transformation” and “plant
technology” headings simultaneously are more likely to be those relating to the
commonly used, narrow definition of biotechnology. The figure demonstrates
that only in the last 3 years of the database did ARS receive more than a single
patent falling under both classifications. Instead,ARS patented more frequently
in areas such as biological control of pests or animal protection technologies
such as vaccines than in the agricultural biotechnology subfield of genetic
transformation.
Licensing of ARS-Patented Technology
Trends in patenting provide one measure of the intellectual property produced
by an institution. The licensing of these patents is another measure that shows
how this intellectual property is being used. Table 4 indicates the current state
of technology transfer for patented and licensed USDA technologies. Of the
currently active patent licenses, about one-fifth are generating earned royalty
income. The median earned royalty income is small ($3,102) in FY 2003.
Apart from the amounts set aside for inventors, ARS applies financial returns
to the operation of its OTT, not to financing research (Day Rubenstein, 2003).
Day Rubenstein recently completed a comprehensive examination of 224
active licenses granted by USDA’s Agricultural Research Service through June
2000. These licenses were categorized on the basis of research problem areas
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32The time period 1980-2000 was
chosen in preference to 1976-2000 to
make trends more clear; the total
patents issued to the USDA fell
steeply from 1976-79.
2000
USDA and other U.S. agricultural biotechnology patents 
Figure 6
Log scale 
Source: USDA ERS Agricultural Biotechnology Inellectual Property Database and ERS calculations based on USPTO data.
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All ag biotechas designated by the Current Research Information Systems (CRIS). Here
we consider some of the characteristics of these licensed technologies.
On the basis of patent counts (i.e., not taking into account the effects of
multiple licenses issued for certain patents), the most frequent areas for
licensing were plant protection, animal protection, food products and
processing, nonfood products and processing, and human health (fig. 8).
Somewhat fewer patents were licensed in the traditional research areas of
plant and animal production. Food safety and human nutrition are areas with
strong public-good components. There were relatively few technologies
patented in the environmental research area, which also includes strong
public-good components.
Day Rubenstein also examined licensed technologies for the social (as
opposed to purely private) benefits they might offer. As she points out,
exclusively licensed technology is, almost by definition, unlikely to offer
pure public good. Nonetheless, each licensed technology was examined to
determine whether it offered one of four social benefits: food safety, human
nutrition, human health, and environmental or natural resource protection.33
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33The author’s judgment was the
basis for this examination. Criteria
were explicitly stated, consistently
applied, and therefore replicable. 
Figure 7
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Source: USDA ERS Agricultural Biotechnology Intellectual Property Database and ERS 
calculations based on USPTO data. 
Table 4
Selected USDA technology transfer data for FY 2003
Item Amount
Active CRADAs1 229
U.S. patent applications filed 60
U.S. patents issued 64
Active patent licenses 270
Licenses generating earned royalty income 56
Total license revenues $2.3 million
Median earned royalty income $3,102
1CRADA: Cooperative Research and Development Agreement.
Source: D.J. Blalock, 2004.In a sense, this exercise attempted to answer the question of whether the
patenting and licensing mechanism can still be used to transfer technologies
that have some public-good components that may not necessarily be
captured by the private sector partner.
The number of licensed technologies in each research area with some of
these social benefits depended on two things: the total number of technolo-
gies in that research area and the percentage of licensed technologies associ-
ated with one or more of the four social benefits. Over half the technologies
licensed offered one of the four social benefits, though findings varied by
research area. Plant protection technologies—primarily those in the sub-
areas of biological pest control or resistant varieties—had the greatest
number of licenses that offered particular social benefits. Almost 70 percent
of the licenses for nonfood products and processing technologies (an area
typically associated with higher private benefits) provided one or more
social benefits. Therefore, evidence from the study indicates that the use of
patenting and licensing is not limited to technologies whose benefits are
associated solely with private research interests.
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Patents in ARS’s licensing system1
Figure 8
1Patents may be captured in more than one category. 
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Using Patents
This chapter provides descriptions of the technology transfer process for
four specific patented technologies, summarized in table 5. It allows the
observation of idiosyncratic aspects of patented technologies and special
circumstances of licensee firms, as well as other details of technology
transfer that might not appear at a more abstract, statistical level of analysis.
Observation of these case studies is primarily based on interviews with tech-
nology transfer practitioners, including research scientists, licensing profes-
sionals, and technology partners at licensed firms. The cases provide
detailed observations of research and licensing behavior as it is practiced in
reality. 
The selection of cases is an important element of case study analysis. For
instance, the choice of cases involving the transfer of patented technology
limits the scope of the study to technologies for which ARS primarily
pursued patent protection rather than other channels of technology transfer.
In general, selecting too narrow a range of cases can lead researchers to
overlook issues that do not happen to be prominent in the cases at hand.
Likewise, issues that happen to be important for the selected cases might be
otherwise uncommon. 
We limited the case studies to ARS technologies protected by patents
because of the significance of this method of technology transfer. As
discussed in previous chapters, the use of patents and licensing is a rela-
tively new and increasingly important means of technology transfer not just
for ARS but also for other Federal research agencies. Furthermore, the case
studies described in this chapter also show that other technology transfer
methods such as CRADAs and open publication often accompany patent-
assisted technology transfer. To avoid other pitfalls from case selection, this
report drew its case studies from research in very different fields of science.
Also, the case study technologies resulted in a variety of licensing outcomes
that range from a successfully commercialized product that is still gener-
ating licensing royalty revenue for ARS, to licenses that are still at various
phases of development, to still other licenses that have been abandoned.
With these precautions in place, the case studies in this chapter are representa-
tive of major licensing practices at ARS. They serve as a basis for observing a
wide range of patenting and licensing policies as they are currently imple-
mented, and do so at a level of detail that complements the statistical analyses
presented in the “Technology Transfer by Federal Agencies” and “Technology
Transfer at the Agricultural Research Service” chapters. 
Case 1: Enhancement of Nitrogen Fixation with
Bradyrhizobium japonicum Mutants
In the late 1970s, ARS researchers began working with bacteria from the
genus Bradyrhizobium that were eventually the subject of a U.S. patent.
Researchers isolated a particular strain of Bradyrhizobia that was effective
in inducing nodulation in leguminous plants. Nodulation is a symbiotic
process in which a leguminous seedling (such as soy) secretes the amino
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Table 5
Patents used in case studies
Patent number Inventor Title Abstract
and issue date
5,021,076 Kuykendall et al. Enhancement of “A prototrophic revertant of a Bradyrhizobium japonicum
June 4, nitrogen fixation with tryptophan auxotroph was isolated and found to fix more
1991 Bradyrhizobium nitrogen symbiotically than wild-type bacteria.The
japonicum mutants increase in nitrogen fixation is due to an increase in
nodule mass because of an increase in nodule number.
The physiological basis for this improved symbiosis
appears to be an alteration of the tryptophan 
biosynthetic pathway.”
5,591,434 Jenkins et al. DNA sequence “Recombinant proteins have been developed for the
January 7, encoding surface immunization of animals against cryptosporidiosis.The
1997 protein of Cryptosporidium proteins are effective for the immunization of a variety of
parvum animals against Cryptosporidium parvum, particularly
for the production of hyperimmune colostrum that may be 
used to confer passive immunity against the parasite.
Isolated DNA sequences which encode these proteins
have also been developed.The DNA sequences may be
inserted into recombinant DNA molecules such as
cloning vectors or expression vectors for the
transformation of cells and the production of the proteins.”
Also see United States Patent 6,277,973
B1, Cloning and expression of a DNA 
sequence encoding a 41 kDa 
Cryptosporidium parvum oocyst wall
protein.
5,689,054 Raboy Low-phytic-acid “Single-gene, nonlethal mutations responsible for
November 18, mutants and selection low-phytic-acid-containing seeds are selectable
1997 thereof by means of a method for assaying seeds which
are otherwise phenotypically, or nearly
phenotypically, normal. Maize mutants having from
20 percent to 95 percent reductions in kernel phytic acid
phosphorus compared to the wild-type, without any
noticeable reduction in total phosphorus, were isolated
by this method. Mutants obtained in accordance with the
invention are useful for developing commercial,
low phytic acid seed, plant lines.”
Also see United States Patent 6,111,168,
Low-phytic-acid mutants and selection 
thereof.
5,705,030 Gassner, III et al. Fiber and fiber “A wide variety of end products may be manufactured
January 6, products produced from fibers or fiber pulp derived from feathers.
1998 from feathers Examples of such end products are paper and
paper-like products, non-woven and woven fibers,
insulation,filters, extrusions, and composite sheets
and plates.”
Also see United States Patent 6,027,608, Conversion
of avian feather-waste stream to useful products. (Not 
assigned to the U.S. Department of Agriculture.)
Source: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.acid tryptophan, which encourages the growth of Bradyrhizobia. These
Bradyrhizobia infect the seedling, after which they secrete an enzyme that
increases seedling nitrogen fixation. Nitrogen fixation helps plants make
more efficient use of fertilizer, which can improve yields or reduce fertilizer
input requirements. 
The patent application for the Bradyrhizobium strain was filed in 1989, and
the patent was granted in 1991. At the time the patent was issued, ARS did
not have a technology partner to market the discovery, but research at ARS
indicated that coating soy seeds with the bacteria through a process called
inoculation generated higher yields in some tests. ARS negotiated material
transfer agreements with both major suppliers in the relatively small U.S.
inoculant market so that they could perform further testing and develop-
ment. Although one inoculant supplier declined to license the technology,
the other firm agreed to a licensing agreement with ARS in 1994. Sales of
an inoculant product using the Bradyrhizobium strain began shortly there-
after, generating licensing royalty payments to ARS. This license has been
recognized with several awards for successful implementation of technology
transfer commercialization.
Case 2: DNA Sequence Encoding Surface Protein
of Cryptosporidium parvum 
Cryptosporidiosis is a diarrheal disease caused by a microscopic parasite,
Cryptosporidium parvum. This parasite can live in the intestine of humans
and animals and is passed in the stool of an infected person or animal. It
had been a particularly difficult disease to prevent or treat because infected
animals were unresponsive to vaccines and no medications were available to
treat infections. Kansas State University researchers discovered a protein
antibody that could be used in the diagnosis of cryptosporidiosis, and ARS
researchers joined the research effort to clone the gene associated with this
antibody and produce recombinant proteins suitable for vaccinations.
Kansas State was relatively new to the patenting process, and as a result
assigned patent rights to ARS. ARS filed a patent application in 1994 and
was awarded a patent in 1997. 
Initial private sector interest in the technology came from the human phar-
maceutical market. In particular, acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
(AIDS) patients with compromised immune systems were at higher risk for
cryptosporidiosis. A CRADA with a pharmaceutical company led to an
exclusive license for the antibody. As new human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV) drugs became available, one of their beneficial side effects was to
reduce the risk of cryptosporidiosis in these patients. With the accompa-
nying decrease in the potential market for the antibody, the pharmaceutical
company terminated its technology license. 
Licensing interest shifted to development of a veterinary vaccine, particu-
larly for cryptosporidiosis in bovines. Correspondence with two companies
with substantial animal health product lines began by 1999, and they negoti-
ated terms for co-exclusive licenses. As required by the Federal Technology
Transfer Act of 1996, ARS published a notice in the Federal Register of its
intent to issue the licenses. Before the licenses could issue, another
company with an animal health product line objected. To accommodate this
31
Government Patenting and Technology Transfer / ERR-15
Economic Research Service/USDAthird company, ARS agreed to issue another co-exclusive license. ARS
agreed to limit the number of co-exclusive licenses to these three firms. To
date, at least one of these firms is continuing efforts to develop and
commercialize a vaccine using the licensed technology. 
Case 3: Low-Phytic-Acid Mutants and Selection Thereof
Research into the metabolic pathways of phytic acid was first motivated by
nutritional needs of both humans and animals, but environmental considera-
tions also became a consideration for this research. High-phytic-acid
concentrations in animal feed prevent monogastric animals like swine and
poultry from absorbing phosphorus, an important nutrient. Dietary supple-
ments such of phytase enzymes can increase phosphorus availability to the
animals, but at an additional expense. Another effect of unabsorbed phos-
phorus is that it can pass into animal waste, eventually leading to phospho-
rous contamination of land surfaces and surface and ground water. 
Low-phytic-acid mutants in maize—a major source of animal feed in the
U.S.—were isolated by an ARS researcher in the early 1990s. A potential
application of this discovery was for animal feed that did not require supple-
ments, improving animal health and reducing phosphorus runoff in the envi-
ronment. ARS contacted 12 companies to gauge interest in technology
licenses. Of those companies, six expressed interest, and eventually a
CRADA was signed with a large seed/genetic research company in 1993,
before the first patent application was filed in 1994. The patent was granted
in 1997. A license was negotiated with the original CRADA partner, but two
other seed/genetic research companies requested and successfully negotiated
co-exclusive licenses. Two of the three seed companies were large compa-
nies that have since been acquired by multinational chemical/life sciences
firms. The other genetic research company was a small company spun off
from a large seed multinational in 1994 but bought by a large multinational
chemical/life sciences firm in 2000. 
Three aspects of the low-phytic-acid breeding technology have posed prob-
lems for commercial development:
(1) Cultivated varieties with the low phytic acid trait also appear to
carry a yield penalty. Neither the potential cost savings from a reduction
in phytase dietary supplements nor the increase in animal health from
greater phosphorus uptake are sufficient to make up for the higher cost
of producing the low phytic acid maize varieties.
(2) Changes in ownership among the licensees may have brought corre-
sponding changes in the R&D strategies of the licensee firms.
(3) Views on the importance of mitigating environmental release of
phosphorus may have changed since the initial research project.
This remains an active license, although no commercial products are imme-
diately forthcoming. 
Case 4: Fiber and Fiber Products Produced from Feathers
In the course of research into chemical and physical properties of materials,
ARS scientists discovered that keratin from chicken feathers can be made
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into fibers that behave similarly to plant fibers made from cellulose. Chicken
feathers make up a large waste stream for modern poultry production facilities,
so an alternative use for this material could possibly have environmental as
well as economic benefits. In addition, the market for fiber products from
cellulose-base sources is very large: examples include diapers, industrial and
automotive filters, fabrics, insulation, and structural components. This large
market improves the chances of finding a market segment for which feather
fibers offer a cost or performance advantage.
There are currently three possible means of disposing of poultry feathers:
(1) Burning, which poses environmental concerns and is difficult and
costly because the feathers emerge wet from chicken-processing facili-
ties
(2) Burying, which is uneconomical because of their low density
(3) Grinding into feather meal, a low-cost, low-quality animal feed
A patent application for a technique of cleaning and drying feathers and
mechanically separating keratin fibers was filed in 1995 and a patent issued
in 1998. Initially a large poultry producer collaborated with ARS in a 3-year
CRADA, and had the option to license the technology exclusively. After a
few extensions from ARS, this producer declined to exercise its licensing
rights. 
ARS followed this unsuccessful attempt at technology transfer by licensing the
technology co-exclusively to three firms: a different large poultry producer,
which also needed to manage its feather waste stream; a rendering plant, which
had the same need; and a firm that was already using the quill component of
feathers as a production input for a line of nutritional and cosmetic products.
Although one firm has abandoned its license, at least one other firm is actively
pursuing new commercial applications of the technology.Policy Lessons from Technology Transfer
Case Studies
Case studies provide an opportunity to observe actions and behaviors. The
case studies described in the “Case Studies of ARS Technology Transfer
Using Patents” chapter illustrate many of the economic tradeoffs underlying
the decisions of technology transfer officers and their licensing partners.
These observations permit an economic analysis, which can then be
compared with the stated rationales of practitioners from interviews. For
instance, some situations call for ARS’s OTT to balance policy objectives
against the demands of potential licensees, as it does when deciding how
many licenses to grant. Open licensing of a technology might be the least
restrictive approach to licensing, but potential technology partners some-
times demand an exclusive license to compensate for technology and appro-
priation risks associated with the project. 
Although the case studies provide a wealth of information, interpreting their
specific circumstances to arrive at more general conclusions about tech-
nology transfer policy poses some problems. One issue is the confidentiality
of licensing agreements between the USDA and its technology partners.
Licenses contain sensitive business information that might create problems
for the licensees if it were divulged: for example, the degree to which any
particular licensee is pursuing development of a technology, whether a
particular license is generating royalty income for USDA, and if so, the
amount of that royalty income.34 Furthermore, interviews with technology
transfer participants were conducted under a pledge of confidentiality to
ensure candid observations for the case studies. Preserving the confiden-
tiality of case study information sometimes requires details from the case
studies to be omitted from the conclusions presented in this chapter. Where
possible, this chapter attempts to support conclusions by presenting them
alongside specific facts from relevant case studies. 
The technology transfer process frequently involves several decisions made
simultaneously under tight legal and commercial deadlines. In other cases,
the path toward commercialization is indirect and idiosyncratic. This chapter
organizes conclusions of economic analysis of the case studies into a
sequence that roughly follows a linear model of the technology transfer
process, from research to license negotiation to commercialization.
Technology Partners
The determination of the ARS Patent Review Committee to patent and
license a technology is frequently made with a technology partner already in
mind, although this is not always the case (e.g., Bradyrhizobium). OTT
managers spend a significant amount of time performing the critical task of
identifying a wide variety of potential licensing partners to find appropriate
matches. Choosing from a broad set of licensing partners diversifies tech-
nology risk across different companies and industries and increases the like-
lihood of successful commercialization. The Cryptosporidium case is an
example of a technology with potential application in multiple markets;
pursuing licenses for both veterinary and human pharmaceutical applica-
tions provided more opportunities for successful commercialization.
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34Knowledge of the terms of the
license along with royalty payments
also would reveal another confidential
item, product sales.
ARS seeks out a wide variety
of technology partners.Technology transfer officers have an obvious choice of licensing partner
when initial research is conducted under a CRADA. Most of the case study
technologies were developed at some point with a CRADA partner.35 Under
the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1996, CRADA partners have the
right of first refusal for an exclusive technology license before a license can
be granted to another party. 
When technology is developed without a CRADA partner, or after a
CRADA partner declines the option to license exclusively, ARS is free to
search for other licensing partners. One strategy is to pursue licenses in a
niche market. By definition, niche market technologies are served by a small
number of firms, in which case the technology itself suggests technology
partners. Another strategy is for Federal researchers to explore interest in the
relevant field of science for the invention through contacts at research
conferences and professional meetings. Both of these strategies for finding
technology partners were employed in the eventual licensing of the
Bradyrhizobium patent.
Industry structure can be an additional guide to possible technology part-
ners. Firms upstream and downstream in the supply chain from a technology
partner candidate are also potential licensees. Depending on interactions
between suppliers and customers, licensees at different positions in the
supply chain might have different incentives for cooperation and technolog-
ical development. 
The feather fiber patent is an example of how this strategy for finding
licensing partners can work. ARS reached a licensing agreement with an
obvious source of soiled feathers, a large processor of poultry for human
consumption. Another license was offered to a firm downstream in the
poultry-processing supply chain that processed poultry offal as pet food. A
third license was offered to another downstream firm already using feather
protein to manufacture nutritional supplements.
License Exclusivity
A critical licensing decision for an OTT is the number of licenses it should
grant. The agency can grant one license, multiple licenses, or even publish
the discovery so that it is freely available to all (see box, “Varying Degrees
of License Exclusivity” p. 10). Potential licensees expressed a preference
for exclusive licenses to remove one source of appropriation risk: competi-
tion from other licensees. Economic theory predicts higher prices and
profits when there is only one supplier, explaining this preference. In some
cases, expanding the number of co-exclusive licenses may have had the
effect of reducing incentives for further product development. 
However, under the right market conditions and licensing strategies,
multiple co-exclusive license agreements did not pose a barrier to successful
technology transfer in some case studies. The advantages of multiple
licenses for diversifying technology risk are discussed in the previous
section. Another goal of technology transfer is to maximize the use of a
technology. In general, suppliers in competitive markets offer lower prices
and thus encourage more widespread introduction of the technology adop-
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35Although many ARS technologies
are now developed with a CRADA,
the proportion of licenses to CRADA
partners is somewhat smaller because
not all of them exercise their licensing
option; see the chapter titled
"Technology Transfer at the
Agricultural Research Service (ARS)."
Multiple licenses address
appropriation risk, while
exclusive licenses focus on
technology risk.tion. Co-exclusive licenses and other less exclusive licensing agreements
increase competitive pressure compared with sole exclusive licenses. 
Although it is not possible to generalize the net result of multiple licenses on
technology transfer directly from the case studies, it is interesting to consider
what might have happened to commercialization of the Bradyrhizobium inoc-
ulant if both major inoculant suppliers had licensed the patent instead of just
one. Would the prospect of competition have undermined investments in
development? Or would the competition have driven both competitors to
distribute the technology at a lower price to more customers? Another ques-
tion is whether ARS can adopt licensing policies and practices that influence
the outcome, a possibility discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter.
Licensee business plans, market size, profitability, and the availability of
substitutes for the invention are some of the relevant factors that determine
the degree of exclusivity that potential licensees will accept. For instance,
one business plan might involve selling a product or service based on the
invention at a small profit margin, but to a large number of customers. In a
potentially profitable market where one licensee would have trouble satis-
fying demand for the product, it appears that additional supply from
competitors under co-exclusive licenses did not slow down licensee devel-
opment efforts. Likewise, where noninfringing substitutes already limit the
markup over production costs that a licensee can charge, competition from
these substitutes may be more relevant than competition from other
licensees that price at a similar markup. An example of a noninfringing
substitute from the feather-fiber license is feather meal. The potential use of
soiled feathers as feather meal places a lower bound for the profitability of
cleaned feathers for other industrial uses. However, if competition with
other licensees erodes the already small profit margin, licensees may balk at
taking out a license and technology transfer may not occur. 
Another licensee business plan might involve selling a product or service
based on the invention at a very high price, a strategy that is more likely to
succeed when the quantity demanded is relatively unresponsive to price.
Charging a high price already limits the number of willing buyers some-
what, but the absence of feasible alternatives might justify high profit
margins in this market. This strategy might not be sustainable under co-
exclusive licensing. If customers can obtain a close substitute from other
licensees, this business plan might not be sufficiently profitable to justify
interest in technology transfer. The risks posed by either licensee might
cause both to avoid the technology. None of the technologies in the case
studies appeared to adopt this strategy for commercialization.
Licensee Characteristics
Although there are numerous ways that licensing can work, successful
licensees share some common attributes. A certain degree of entrepreneurial
energy was necessary for all of the eventual licensees to find out about ARS
research and apply for technology licenses. Small startup firms organized
around the development and commercialization of a new ARS technology were
relatively focused on its development. However, larger and more established
firms often proved to be equally aggressive in pursuing licenses and carrying
out development. 
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abilities.Each of the licensees required access to financial capital necessary for upfront
expenditures on technology development. Sources and cost of that capital were
factors in the ability to obtain a license and pursue technology development.
When patents, licenses, and other intangible assets represent a significant frac-
tion of a firm’s total value, valuation of those intangible assets can affect access
to collateralized loans or the terms of additional equity investment. In these
cases, licensees cited licenses of patent-protected ARS research as an important
factor for raising capital for commercialization investments. Moreover, inability
to raise sufficient capital was a constraining factor in several licenses, notwith-
standing OTT efforts to screen out undercapitalized firms.
More established firms in our case studies were able to finance their own
investments in technology development, through previous issuance of debt or
equity or through earnings retained from other operations.36 While funding
from these internal sources might be less expensive, their availability depends
on a firm’s other resources and investment opportunities. For instance, access
to inexpensive capital financing did not guarantee that the company had the
managerial time, talent, or complementary assets to carry out a successful tech-
nology development program for licensed ARS technology. Other factors were
certainly at play, including market demand, technology risk, and the prof-
itability of existing operations or alternative projects. 
Industry Experience
Industry experience is another characteristic that can be important. Do
licensees have the background and experience to succeed? Firms already
familiar with an industry might be better suited to take advantage of a new
technology, and might be able to develop technology as an ancillary operation
rather than as a central business concept. 
From the case studies, a challenge confronting some licensees of the low-
phytic-acid maize patent was obtaining a competitive maize hybrid in which to
incorporate the low-phytic-acid trait. Since the early embodiments of the tech-
nology also had a side effect of reducing yields, placement of the trait in an
already high-yielding variety would be an advantage. A company with comple-
mentary assets in the form of an existing corn breeding program is likely to
face less difficulty meeting this challenge than a company without relevant
experience. Similarly, a potential advantage among feather fiber licensees was
prior industry experience with efficient disposal of feathers and other poultry
processing byproducts. A firm already managing a waste stream of chicken
feathers might have greater incentive and aptitude for development of the
feather fiber technology. 
Company Size
Small and large companies alike can benefit from successful technology
transfer. Small businesses like the niche market licensee of the Bradyrhizobium
patent can be effective competitors, satisfying market demand and successfully
moving technology into profitable development. Moreover, license grants to
small businesses satisfy the explicit intent of Federal technology transfer legis-
lation. First preference for federally licensed technologies typically goes to
businesses with fewer than 500 employees, provided they have equal or greater
likelihood of bringing the invention to practical application within a reasonable
time (35 USC 209).37
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36Debt refers to a liability that must
be repaid; interest is usually paid on
debt. Equity refers to stock issued by a
company. 
37The Small Business
Administration publishes the Small
Business Size Regulations that defines
“small businesses” for each industry,
based on either number of employees
or size of annual revenues.Licensing Terms
Ex ante technology assessment
A challenge to negotiations between licensees and OTT is that the exact size
and characteristics of a market are typically not known in advance, or ex
ante. Until a product is developed and made available for sale, the size and
characteristics of a market can only be estimated. Unfortunately, terms of a
licensing agreement must be negotiated before technology transfer can
move forward or market size can be definitively known. Licensing negotia-
tions must account for differing estimates about the value of the technology,
with repercussion on the licensing terms. Negotiations can adjust terms of a
license to reflect different views on market size, market characteristics, tech-
nology risk, and appropriation risk, but reasonable people can often differ in
their assessment of these factors. 
Negotiating license agreements in this environment is therefore a difficult
but intrinsic challenge to technology transfer. Flexible licensing approaches,
including renegotiation, may be necessary as more is learned about a tech-
nology and the market in which the technology is commercialized. Against
this flexible approach, technology transfer officers must weigh the need for
credible commitments from both sides. 
Empirical studies of licensing behaviors show that royalties are used in a
majority of licensing agreements, and that agreements often combine license
execution fees, milestone payments, and royalties (Taylor and Silberstone,
1973; Rostoker 1984; Macho-Stadler et al., 1996; Basquet 1998; Thursby et
al., 2001). The case studies show a similar diversity as to which licensing
terms were employed. By tailoring the specificity of performance mile-
stones, the incentives of licensing fees, the risk allocation of royalties, and
the degree of competition implied by the number of licenses offered, an
OTT can craft a licensing agreement that is appropriate for its technology
and acceptable to its technology partners.
Specific Performance Clauses
Licensing terms seek to expedite technology development. One way to
achieve this is to require specific goals to be met in a given time period. For
example, some licenses required construction of a production facility within
a predetermined date after license execution. Specific performance require-
ments are useful in comparing the measures that different licensees will
undertake to develop and commercialize a licensed invention. 
Licensing Fees
Licensing fees are a straightforward element of a technology transfer
license, involving a transfer of a specific amount of money in exchange for
a license to use the technology. License fees are typically payable upon
execution of the license.
Another type of licensing fee, sometimes referred to as a “milestone
payment,” is payable at some point after license execution. Milestone
payments can be triggered by an agreed time interval (e.g., 5 years after
license execution) or by completion of a specific performance requirement
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Terms of a licensing agreement
affect more than the bottom
line.(e.g., completion of a working prototype or production facility). Licensing
fees paid upon license execution commit licensee resources to the project,
screening out licensees that lack the ability, resources, or motivation to
proceed immediately with technology development. In addition, a portion of
licensing fees is distributed to ARS inventors, creating incentives both to
research patentable technology and to assist in its development. 
Jensen and Thursby (2001) found that licensing fees payable at subsequent
intervals may prevent “technology shelving,” instead prompting licensees to
perform the technology development and commercialization efforts neces-
sary to generate an income flow sufficient to meet fee payments. This
analysis is consistent with views expressed by case study participants.
Licensing Royalties
Royalties are another way to generate licensing revenue. Royalties stipulate
a fee based on sales of products or services based on the licensed invention.
Royalty fees assessed as a per unit charge on the licensee have the undesir-
able effect of increasing the licensee’s unit cost of producing and selling the
invention, which discourages its widespread use at the margin. Kamien and
Tauman (1986) show that fee-only licensing is theoretically superior to
royalty-only licensing for patent owners, consumers, and society as a whole,
because lump sum fees provide a monetary incentive to inventors, yet lack
the price-distorting effect of royalties.
License negotiators can attempt to structure royalties to get around this
problem. For instance, royalties based on sale revenues rather than units
sold offer an improvement in both licensee profit and consumer benefit for
the same amount of royalty revenue (Bousquet et al., 1998). Royalties can
also be phased in at specific amounts. For instance, a fixed royalty payable
when total sales reach specific increments does not discourage additional
sales except very close to the incremental border. Royalty rates can also
vary with the amount of sales (so called “nonlinear” royalty rates), which
helps to tailor a license agreement to the specific circumstances of the tech-
nology. Although ARS used some of these royalty devices, achieving the
theoretically optimal licensing structure in general might require an auction
process (Kamien, 2002), which is at odds with the actual process of Federal
technology transfer.
Despite their drawbacks, royalties can serve several important functions.
Licensees confirmed that royalty components of licensing revenue were less
risky for licensees than fixed licensing-fee components: under a royalty
agreement, licensees did not pay royalties unless the invention overcomes
technology and appropriation risks and enters a productive phase of devel-
opment (Bousquet et al., 1998). In this way, royalties can reduce risk and
help overcome the ex ante problem discussed above, even if they are less
efficient ex post. 
The economics literature suggests other important functions of royalties,
although they might not always apply to Federal technology transfer. If the
licensor knows that the technology is likely to be very valuable, reducing
upfront licensing fees in exchange for higher royalty payments signals a high
value of an invention to the licensee (Gallini and Wright, 1990). Similarly,
39
Government Patenting and Technology Transfer / ERR-15
Economic Research Service/USDAlicensees with an advantage in or knowledge about the downstream market
can offer to pay higher royalty payments to separate themselves from other
potential licensees (Beggs, 1992). Some of these signaling models are sensi-
tive to assumptions about the number of licensees, the sequence in which
license terms are negotiated, and other factors that might conflict with the
actual process of technology transfer as governed by Federal guidelines.38 It
is not clear that participants in the case studies explicitly utilized any of
these insights from theoretical models of signaling and screening with royal-
ties.
Royalties are efficient licensing mechanisms in another class of models, in
which the licensor competes in the downstream market against licensees. In
these models, the licensor profits both from the royalty payments and from
raising competitors’ marginal costs by the amount of the royalty (Rockett
1990; Kamien and Tauman, 2001). The efficiency of royalties in these
models depends on two assumptions, that the licensor competes against the
licensees and that the licensor maximizes licensing revenues; neither
assumption is likely to apply to Federal technology transfer. With respect to
the latter assumption, licensing revenues from fees and royalties are one
goal of Federal technology transfer among many, with priority also given to
moving technology “off the shelf,” addressing market failures, encouraging
small businesses, and other goals.
Technology Development Assistance
Most Federal research requires additional development effort to become a
successful product. Although primarily engaged in “basic” research on
fundamental science problems with widespread applicability, ARS
researchers in our cases also described a role in their jobs for “applied”
development geared toward a specific product. This view of ARS scientists
in our case study comports with a study by Crow and Bozeman (1998), who
found that researchers at Federal laboratories view technology transfer as an
important part of their jobs. 
It is reasonable to conclude that the same researchers who invent patented
research are uniquely well-suited to further development of the technology.
Toole and Czarnitzki (2005) explore the role of scientist involvement in
commercialization in the Federal Small Business Innovation Research
program, and conclude that scientist involvement is an important factor in
technology transfer. The case studies in this report exhibit a wide range of
perceived and actual behaviors. In at least one case, an ARS scientist
performed additional tasks that helped commercialize the resulting invention.
In another case, the ARS scientist took a less active role, but still made
some suggestions to help guide further research. The case studies also
included a situation in which at least one licensee felt that lack of tech-
nology development assistance by ARS was a barrier to commercialization
that eventually halted technology transfer. 
Incentives exist to encourage Federal researchers to provide development
assistance to licensing partners. For instance, patents are treated as a publi-
cation in performance evaluations of Federal scientists. In keeping with the
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38Parties to a transaction may not
have the same information. A signal-
ing model is one in which an observed
economic action separates individuals
or firms into two or more groups and
reveals information that was not
observable directly before that action.
Sometimes product develop-
ment requires more research.basic premise of the Stevenson-Wydler Act, scientists also receive a portion
of licensing revenues resulting from their research. 
However, there are some barriers to additional product-development assis-
tance by Federal laboratories:
(1) Time spent in development is taken from the primary role of
researchers, which is to conduct basic research on the next set of prob-
lems identified by USDA National Program leaders.
(2) Incentives for the researcher to work on further product develop-
ment might be limited. Although monetary awards for developers exist,
career advancement is primarily measured by the scientific value of
research (7 USC 7657). To a lesser extent, this problem exists at the
prepatent, basic stage of research as well: although patents are counted
as a scientific publication towards annual performance reviews, inter-
views with ARS inventors suggest that patents are more time-consuming
to achieve than journal publications.
(3) Development assistance can set up potential conflicts of interest,
especially when a patent has multiple licensees. Assistance rendered to
one licensee might harm the competitiveness of the other licensees.
Consumer surveys indicate that the Federal Government has a strong
reputation for providing science-based, impartial information (Gaskell et
al., 1999). USDA interactions require continuing adherence to the mis-
sion and core values of research agencies, which could be compromised
if the USDA were to be viewed as partial to a particular commercial
concern.
License Abandonment
For some technologies in our case studies, licensees chose to abandon their
licenses. Contributing causes included inability of licensees to secure
financing, unforeseen problems with the technology, or other unexpected
hurdles that were not apparent at license execution. Some amount of license
abandonment is probably inevitable considering the risky nature of tech-
nology transfer and commercialization. Subsequent licensing fees (“mile-
stone payments”) may have provoked license termination decisions, because
they impose a direct cost for continued lack of success. In some cases, early
termination of a license probably represented a more efficient course of
action than carrying on unsuccessfully.
License abandonment can be mutually advantageous for both ARS and its
licensees. Certainly, it is advantageous for a licensee with an unworkable
technology to move on to other endeavors. Abandonment probably reduces
OTT administration costs of unsuccessful licenses. Furthermore, in the case
of co-exclusive licenses, remaining licensees see their share of the market
increase, which increases incentives for additional development. For diffi-
cult, expensive, or marginal technologies—the ones most likely to see
license abandonment in the first place—licensee exit is a self-equilibrating
mechanism to reward successful licensees.
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Circumstances might require
parties to end their agreement.Agency Mission and Licensing Strategy
Federal technology transfer legislation and USDA technology transfer
policy are designed to accomplish many goals, as outlined in chapters 3 and
4. Licensing of USDA technology is only one of several approaches to the
fast and widespread dissemination of scientific research.
Even when technology transfer through licensing of Federal technology is
an appropriate policy, technology transfer goals must be balanced against
broader Federal research goals. Rules aimed at making the technology
transfer process fair and transparent illustrate this point. For example, the
names of technology partners selected for licenses are required to be
published in the Federal Register, at which point other firms can file appeals
and seek to obtain licenses themselves (37 CFR 404.7). Although members
of the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) have poli-
cies in place that encourage technology transfer in the public interest, they
are largely free from the specific disclosure requirements found in the Code
of Federal Regulations. As a result, their licensing behavior is frequently
very different than that of Federal OTTs. Greater prevalence of exclusive
licenses by universities suggests that Federal technology transfer policies
sometimes constrain Federal OTT choices. Process rules are not always the
preferred means for technology transfer: the transparency and fairness
required of Federal licensing offices is balanced against the potential for an
open process to slow down technology transfer in many cases, or to preempt
favorable terms for the Federal Government. 
Another example of balancing Federal research goals against technology
transfer outcomes is the case of “orphan markets.” An orphan market is one
in which new and improved products are technologically feasible, but small
market demand or limited ability to pay discourages firms from undertaking
the risk and expense of R&D. Federal research priorities take into account a
wide variety of national research needs, not just potentially lucrative
markets. Technology transfer through a licensing agreement with a tech-
nology partner might still provide insufficient incentive to encourage supply
and adoption of technologies in orphan industries, even if a functional tech-
nology is available from a Federal laboratory. 
Other Federal goals and policies can weigh heavily on technology transfer
outcomes. An example is the development of low-phytic-acid maize devel-
oped by USDA/ARS. Low-phytic-acid maize provides a potential environ-
mental benefit by decreasing the amount of phosphorus in agricultural
runoff. Standard economic analysis of agricultural runoff suggests that when
polluters are not required to internalize the costs of environmental damage,
they will have insufficient incentive to adopt a technology that minimizes
the environmental costs from runoff. A complementary policy requiring
polluters to internalize the cost of phosphorous runoff might create the
necessary demand to induce adoption of low-phytic-acid maize. Although
designing and implementing complementary policies are far beyond the
scope of OTT resources and mission, the existence or lack of complemen-
tary policies has an important effect on technology transfer decisions and
outcomes.
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Successful technoloy transfer
finds a balance among several
goals and priorities.Despite the limitations of the technology transfer paradigm, a large number
of inventions are a good fit with the aims and practices of technology
transfer legislation. Furthermore, the OTT does not set the policies and rules
under which it operates. Instead, it must pursue its mandate while
conforming to those policies and rules.
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The large intellectual property policy changes of the last quarter century—
the extension of patenting and licensing by inventors in universities and
government laboratories, the creation of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, the extension of patenting to new technological areas, and
the attempts to harmonize IP protection internationally—have resulted in
complex changes in behavior by private firms, universities, and Federal
laboratories. The number of utility patents granted by the U.S. PTO has
grown rapidly, and all three kinds of institutions have increased their
patenting. 
(1) In general, ARS patents and licenses innovations as a means of
technology transfer and not as a means of generating revenue.
The most notable indirect evidence that revenue generation is not a major
motivation for ARS patenting is how licensing funds are used. ARS
licensing revenue is used to fund the operations of its OTT, not as a major
source of research funding. In 2000, licensing revenue was only about 0.3
percent of ARS’s R&D budget.39
The differences between university patenting trends and those of ARS is
further indirect evidence that patenting and licensing by ARS is primarily
done as a means of technology transfer. Although private firms still receive
the vast majority (around 95 percent) of utility patents, patenting by U.S.
universities has increased very rapidly, partly in response to specific policy
factors such as the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. But university
patenting began to increase rapidly before the passage of the Act, so it
cannot have been the only factor.40
Invention disclosures, patent applications, patent grants, patent licensing, and
the use of related technology transfer mechanisms such as CRADAS by
Federal Government research agencies have also increased in recent years,
but available data suggest that these trends began later and were more modest
than equivalent trends for universities. This pattern of more rapid growth in
patenting and licensing by universities is also seen more specifically when
comparing land grant universities with ARS. It is also paralleled in trends for
particular technologies, for example, agricultural biotechnology.
Other indirect evidence that ARS patents and licenses primarily to transfer
technology can be found. The ARS patent-application process follows
careful protocols, with specific questions asked at each step. An important
question is the likelihood of finding an acceptable private sector partner for
commercialization of the technology. These questions are in addition to
discovering the likelihood that a patent can be granted.
(2) The ARS Office of Technology Transfer (OTT) operates in a different
environment than university OTTs.
Protocols for technology transfer through licensing are more restrictive for
the Federal Government than for universities. As one example, ARS must
publish intent to offer an exclusive license in the Federal Register. This may
create greater incentives for eventual licensing by more than one firm. More
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39The use of licensing funds to sup-
port OTT is similar to the practices of
other Federal labs.
40For discussions of the relative
roles of the Bayh-Dole Act and other
factors in stimulating university
patenting, see Henderson, Jaffe, and
Tratjenberg (1998); Jaffe (2000); and
Mowery et al. (2001).generally, the Federal Government follows specific guidelines in the Code
of Federal Regulations to ensure transparency and fairness in its licensing
arrangements.41 All other things equal, first preference for federally licensed
technologies is given to smaller firms (typically fewer than 500 employees).
(3) Increased patenting and licensing by ARS has not been associated
with a decline of traditional instruments of technology transfer such as
scientific publications.
From 1990 through 2003, as ARS patenting and licensing (and other newer
means of technology transfer, CRADAs) have increased, scientific publica-
tion counts for ARS have remained relatively stable. In general, this conclu-
sion holds when output counts are normalized either by scientist-years or by
ARS budgets.
(4) Ex ante determination of successful licensing terms and practices is
very difficult. The success of a license depends on market size, market
characteristics, and technology characteristics, and is subject to both
“technology risk” and “appropriation risk.” Potential market and tech-
nology parameters are often not known in detail when licenses are nego-
tiated, and reasonable people might disagree about them.
Many patents are issued at a proof-of-concept stage, or some other prelimi-
nary stage of development. Technology risk refers to the probability that a
technology can be improved and developed into a feasible commercial
product or process that is an improvement over available alternatives.
Appropriation risk is related to the likelihood that a company will be able to
earn profits from the new technology and not have them captured almost
entirely by competitors. Both the OTT and the technology partner must
agree first, to license, and second, to specific license terms in the absence of
complete information. Patenting and licensing are one means of addressing
appropriation risk, but changing the exclusivity in licensing terms can
change appropriation risk. Furthermore, market characteristics influence the
effects of exclusivity on appropriation risk. These characteristics include the
nature of the demand for products embodying the technology, the size of the
market, the degree of competitiveness in the market, and the expected
growth of the market.
Performance incentives such as milestone requirements or periodic licensing
fees are aimed at reducing technology risk on the part of the licensee. Using
patents as a factor in evaluation of ARS scientists and rewarding successful
patenting monetarily are incentives for reducing technology risk from the
side of ARS.
(5) ARS does retain some flexibility in renegotiating license terms.
Flexibility in license terms is necessary when unforeseen circumstances
arise. In particular, the relevant market size and characteristics may become
clearer over time. Similarly, different characteristics of a particular tech-
nology may turn out to have greater market potential than initially envi-
sioned. Ex post flexibility can correct ex ante mistakes in predicting
technology success or failure.
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41For example, although license
terms are confidential, the identity of
licensees is not.(6) Licensing to more than one firm is more likely to be successful if the
market is segmented geographically or by stages in a production process
than if all firms are competing for the same market niche.
This phenomenon was observable within the case studies. In particular, co-
exclusive licensing in which licensees are direct competitors for the same
market niche can reduce collaborative efforts with ARS inventors in product
development. The potential for direct market competition in an uncertain
environment can also reduce the incentives for product development. Exclu-
sive licensing by territory or field of use, on the other hand, can lead to
greater success in transferring technology. When licensing is used to segre-
gate markets geographically or by stages of production, synergies can be
created in the market, enhancing the use or spread of the technology.
Using the single policy instrument of patenting and licensing to attempt to
achieve multiple Federal policy goals is not feasible. Both the “mission
technology” paradigm—the government conducts research in support of
missions in which there is a national interest—and the “market failure”
paradigm—the government conducts research when private markets do not
provide the socially optimal amount and kind of research—help to explain
why USDA conducts research in the first place. Under both paradigms, it is
plausible to assume that a great deal of USDA’s research has been socially
valuable even when it has not resulted in a relatively near-market, patentable
technology. Estimates of positive returns to public sector agricultural
research (Federal and State) confirm this view.
Because much ARS research cannot be directly commercialized, it is
unlikely that generation of substantial revenue from patents and licensing
would be a major goal of that instrument. The evidence suggests that it has
not been. Other potential uses of government patenting that we initially
considered were promoting awareness of public research results, bringing
credit to the Federal agency performing the work, or patenting defensively
to maintain freedom to operate or to encourage widespread use of federally
developed research tools. Awareness and credit may be two results of ARS
patenting, but they are clearly side benefits, not major motivations for
patenting. In any case, other ARS technology transfer instruments also
provide these benefits. The third motivation mentioned here, defensive
patenting, may be justifiable but there is little evidence that it plays a role in
patenting by ARS. There is a public interest in maintaining access to ARS
technologies, but discussions of patentability by Patent Review Committees
focus much more on finding a commercial partner than on preventing a
private firm from gaining access to ARS technology and blocking others
from using it. It would arguably be more likely for ARS to choose scientific
publication over patenting as a major strategy in the case of a research tool
that is expected to be widely applicable. 
By focusing on technology transfer in situations where patenting and
licensing are necessary to ensure private firm interest, ARS has reduced
some of the inherent contradictions in a multiple-goal environment. Some of
the tools used by ARS—issuance of licenses that are exclusive by territory
or field of use, ex post flexibility in adjusting licensing terms—clearly help
to maintain a balance between meeting Federal policy goals and making
sure technology that can be commercialized actually is commercialized.
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restricted solely to patents and licensing, also helps to preserve this balance.
Additional steps might make the patent and licensing process smoother in
situations in which these instruments are chosen—for example, reducing the
requirements that lead to multiple licenses when markets are overlapping, or
further increasing the flexibility in negotiating licensing terms.
In short, patenting and licensing can be consistent with the objective of
widespread distribution of the benefits of ARS research. A technology that
reaches society through private sector development of ARS research may
provide more net social benefits than a technology that is not developed at
all because no private firm commercializes it—provided technology transfer
activities do not withdraw too many resources from ARS’ most important
missions. This conclusion is likely applicable to other Federal research
agencies, especially when legal requirements for technology transfer are the
same for these agencies. On the other hand, Federal research agencies differ
in the size of research budget, in the markets for possible commercial appli-
cations of their research, and in management structure (particularly for
research conducted by outside contractors). As a result, there may also be
subtle differences in specific technology transfer practices at other agencies.
Further research would be needed to understand how our findings might
apply to practices in other agencies.
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